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Abstract
This study evaluates the revenue productivity of Ghana’s overall tax system and of
individual taxes on the basis of estimates of tax buoyancies and elasticities. It also looks
at the links between the tax reform of 1983-1993 and revenue performance, as well as at
ways of mobilizing additional revenue. The analysis shows that the tax reform has had
significant impact on the productivity of both the individual taxes and the overall tax
system. All the individual taxes, except for cocoa export tax and excise duties, showed
buoyancies and elasticities of more than unity during the reform period, thereby causing
the overall tax system to have a buoyancy and elasticity of more than unity each. The
sharp improvement in the revenue productivity during the reform period was due
principally to the successive devaluations of the exchange rate. It was also supported by
the large inflow of foreign loans, the abolition of the price control and import licensing
system, the simplification of the import tariff rates, and the complete overhaul of the tax
administration. The tax reform succeeded in improving revenue generation, enhancing
the efficiency of the tax administration and improving equity in the tax system. It also
removed market distortions and strengthened economic incentives. Despite this, the share
of government revenue in GDP remains low compared with the average obtained in
developing countries, which calls for ways to mobilize additional revenue. Various revenue
enhancement options were found to be available for use by the tax authorities. These
options include the introduction of VAT to replace the existing sales tax, revaluation of
properties to broaden the base of property tax, a review of the definition of income for
the purposes of income tax, and further improvement in the tax administration to increase
tax collection and to combat evasion and fraud.
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TAX REFORM AND REVENUE PRODUCTIVITY IN GHANA 1
I. Introduction
Economic growth increases the taxable capacity of a country and enables a larger share
of the private sector’s resources to be ceded to the government as taxes to provide public
goods and services. Many countries, therefore, depend mainly on taxation as a means of
generating the required resources to meet their expenditure requirements. These countries
will likely find themselves in growing fiscal imbalance when their revenue productivity
falls below their expenditures. The need for fiscal adjustment then becomes particularly
necessary to restore balance in the government budget.
The efficacy of fiscal adjustment to accomplish fiscal obligations depends on the tax
base or capacity relative to the expenditure requirements of the public sector. This fiscal
position defining the ratio of capacity to requirements approximates the marginal benefits
of public expenditures vis-a-vis marginal sacrifice of the citizenry. The higher the fiscal
performance, with tax efforts yielding high service returns, the nearer the budget moves
towards a balance. To achieve high fiscal performance, however, the various facets of
revenue and expenditure estimates must be meticulously systematized and minutely
analysed within the general macroeconomic framework. Hence budgets that produce
good results tend to analyse prevailing economic circumstances, both internally and
externally, and take into account the macroeconomic projections of economic growth
rate, money supply behaviour, inflationary pressures, employment levels and balance of
payments positions. Without proper analysis and adequate harmony, the formulation of
revenue and expenditure policies that would produce high fiscal performance will not be
achieved.
The Ghanaian experience with fiscal performance in the 1970–1982 period was very
disappointing. During this period, macroeconomic analyses and projections were not
exhaustively undertaken to provide a base for effective and consistent fiscal policy
formulation. Instead, fiscal policy measures were taken on an ad hoc basis, uncoordinated,
and haphazardly implemented, leading to a severe deterioration in the country’s public
finances. A rapid growth in government expenditure accompanied by a relatively low
growth in revenue resulted in persistent budgetary deficits financed mainly by the banking
system. Consequently, the money supply rose sharply, causing rapid growth in the inflation
rate and an increasingly over-valued exchange rate. Attempts to suppress the inflationary
spiral through official control of domestic prices added a further setback to the
government’s economic policy. The price control system, together with the over-valued
exchange rate, created severe distortions in the economy (World Bank, 1984). These in
turn destroyed incentives for production and exports and encouraged speculation and
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smuggling. They also expanded the parallel market activities where large private “rents”
were reaped at the expense of social benefits to the national economy.
The World Bank (1984) also found that economic activity shifted from the monetary
to the subsistence sector, indicating a withdrawal from the monetized economy by some
people and a collapse of the organized markets. These developments led to a sharp
contraction in the tax base and consequently in the ability of the government to mobilize
enough revenue to meet its expenditure requirements. Attempts to increase the tax revenue
without rationalizing the structure of the tax system led to high marginal rates on a
shrinking base. The result was a further deterioration in economic incentives and a massive
shift of economic activities to the parallel markets and expansion of unrecorded cross-
border trade.
In response to the decline of the economy, the Government of Ghana (GOG) initiated
a comprehensive programme of stabilization and structural adjustment in 1983, aimed at
laying the foundations for sustained economic growth and the achievement of external
payments viability. A key element of the programme was the restoration of fiscal discipline
and pursuit of a growth-oriented fiscal strategy. The fiscal adjustment involved not only
a determined effort at expenditure control to reduce budget deficits but also an increase
in domestic resource mobilization through a comprehensive reform in the system of
taxation.
In reducing the fiscal deficit as part of a structural adjustment programme, it is
important to be able to project what additional revenue can be mobilized within the
existing tax system as the economy grows. This requires an analysis of the revenue
sources and their responsiveness to GDP growth. Such an analysis will permit the
identification of the sources of fast revenue growth or, conversely, the causes of lagging
revenue growth, thereby suggesting measures to adopt to maximize revenue within the
existing tax system and/or the need to activate additional means of revenue generation.
Knowledge of the responsiveness of tax revenue to economic growth is thus of crucial
importance for economic planning purposes since budgetary deficits financed through
monetary expansion generally create inflationary problems.
This study focuses on the revenue-generating implications of the tax reform initiated
in Ghana in 1983. The specific objectives are twofold. First, the study seeks to evaluate
the revenue productivity of the overall tax system and of individual taxes on the basis of
estimates of tax elasticities and buoyancies. Second, the study attempts to explain the
links of the tax reform measures to revenue performance and assesses ways of mobilizing
additional revenue.
II. Tax reform: Some theoretical issues,
experience and lessons
Optimal taxation and reform
The theories of optimal taxation are analogous to the examination of the principles of
taxation, where lump-sum taxes are impossible. The analysis of optimal commodity
taxation began with Ramsey (1927), but the subject expanded in the 1970s, following
the Diamond-Mirrlees papers of 1971. The subject of optimal income taxation was created
by Mirrlees (1971).
The general principles of optimal taxation can be summarized as follows: (1 ) tax
revenue is raised most efficiently by taxing goods or factors with inelastic demand or
supply (this abstracts from distributional questions where inelasticity refers to
compensated demands and supplies); and (2) taxation concerned with distribution and
with externalities or market failures should as much as possible go to the root of the
problem. Thus for distribution, one should look for the sources of inequality (for example,
land endowments or earned incomes) and should concentrate taxation there. In the case
of externalities, one should attempt to tax or to subsidize directly the good or activity
that produces the externality (Stern , 1988a).
As can be  seen, the optimal tax theory draws a sharp distinction between cases in
which it is desirable to promote efficiency (because to do so does not compromise the
prospect of equity) and cases in which efficiency must be sacrificed in the pursuit of
equity. Trade taxes and taxes on intermediate goods that introduce inefficiencies into
production, for example,  will be undesirable unless they provide additional leverage
over the distribution of welfare, which they will not, provided that production is
competitive and consumers can be taxed on their consumption. These efficiency results
only require social welfare to be an increasing function of the individual welfare. In
cases where equity and efficiency must be balanced, as in the design of direct and indirect
taxes on consumers, the tax rates will depend on the exact form of the social welfare
function (Newbery, 1988).
The optimal model developed for modern tax analysis appears to be quite inappropriate
for most developing countries. First, the model is perfectly competitive and, in the absence
of distortionary taxes, would yield an efficient equilibrium. The problem here is that
governments are concerned with the issue of raising revenue and improving the distribution
of income but do not have enough information about the preferences and endowments of
their citizens to do so by means of lump-sum taxes. Even if governments are successful
in eliminating market failures in production and in ensuring competitive behaviour and
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hence production efficiency, they would be faced with an inevitable conflict between
equity and efficiency in allocating output among consumers. Governments can, therefore,
make redistributive taxes depend only on information revealed by consumers in the course
of choosing their hours of work, their occupation, and their income and consumption
pattern. When taxes paid are made to depend on these behavioural responses, they
influence and distort the responses with some loss in efficiency. Taxes may also depend
on family size, age and possibly disabilities, which may in large part be unalterable
characteristics . In effect, governments can achieve their aim by using taxes that give rise
to distortions (Newbery, 1988). Second, in the optimal model, the only constraint limiting
the choice of the tax system is information about preferences and endowments, whereas
in developing countries institutional, political, administrative, structural and cultural
constraints may drastically limit the range of tax instruments that are effectively available.
By “tax reform” we mean a movement away from some given status quo. According
to the general theory of tax reform, it will be beneficial to switch taxation at the margin
from i to j, if the marginal cost of tax i exceeds that of tax j. More generally, a tax reform
is beneficial if it increases both revenue and social welfare. In relation to shadow prices,
a tax should be increased if the direct impact on households of making the change exceeds
the cost at shadow prices of the extra demand generated. The shadow price of a good
embodies the welfare consequences of the general equilibrium adjustments that flow
from an extra demand for that good. Thus the shadow price depends on the way in which
the economy adjusts (Stein, 1988b).
Newbery and Stein (1988) have analysed tax reform in a normative framework
provided by the theory of optimal taxation. The analysis attempts to account for the
impact of tax reform on tax-induced losses in the efficiency of resource allocation and
on vertical equity norms. The former dimension of the reform is captured by the
responsiveness of taxpayers to tax-induced relative price changes, and the latter on the
particular specifications of a social welfare function. Optimal tax reforms in this context
tend to be those that minimize efficiency costs (excess burden) of taxation and pay attention
to income inequality. An interesting feature of these reforms is that they seldom endorse
a uniform pattern of tax rates. The Ramsey rule, for example, calls for a highly
differentiated structure of taxation by varying the tax rate inversely with the elasticity of
demand and supply.
Although the reforms suggested by optimal taxation are based upon rigorous economic
theory, as Thirsk (1995), Deaton (1988) and McLure (1989) have emphasized, putting
them into operation leads to an intractably large number of rates, which would be difficult
to calculate and infeasible to administer effectively. Slemrod (1990) has argued that the
optimal tax theory can serve as a guide to designing “optimal tax systems”, only if one
considers the technology of tax collection, i.e., the feasibility of tax instruments, the cost
of administration and compliance.
Despite the flirtation with the undeniable logic of optimal tax theory, many recent tax
reforms have focused on achieving broader based taxation at more uniform rates. Unlike
the earlier pleas for broader based taxation, which called for greater progressivity, the
current appeals are for lower marginal tax rates and reductions in the level of tax-induced
distortions that are prompted by high rates (Thirsk, 1995). In this manner, the lessons of
optimal tax theory have infused recent tax reform efforts with a new respect for economic
efficiency.
Experience with tax reform
Recent experience with growth-oriented adjustment programmes in developing countries
indicates that tax reform is an essential component of any comprehensive strategy for
structural adjustment and resumption of growth (see Chhibber and Khalilzadeh-Shirazi,
1988). As Musgrave (1988) has pointed out, however, tax reform in developing countries
involves broad issues of economic policy as well as specific problems of tax structure
design and administration. First, there are the central problems of revenue requirements
and how to fit the revenue structure into development policy. This area of concern includes
the impact of alternative taxes on saving and investment and their implications for the
macro balance (domestic and foreign) of the economy. Second, there is the important
goal of securing a fair distribution of the tax burden. Among the more specific tax issues,
attention needs to be given to the composition of the tax structure as well as to the design
of its major components. The problem throughout is not simply to determine what would
be desirable but also to assess what is administratively practicable and  within the ballpark
of political feasibility.
A common feature of the tax structures in most developing countries is that they are
complex (difficult to administer and comply with), inelastic (nonresponsive to growth
and discretionary policy measures), inefficient (raise little revenue but introduce serious
economic distortions), inequitable (treat individuals and businesses in similar
circumstances differently), and unfair (tax administration and enforcement are selective
and skewed in favour of those with the resources to defeat the system). There is a heavy
reliance on taxes on international trade, which undermines long-term international
competitiveness. User charges and taxes on income and property contribute only a small
proportion of total revenues. Agricultural income, fringe benefits and, in some countries,
public sector wages are not taxed. Taxes on wealth, bequests, land and property exist in
theory but have been rendered ineffective by design problems or the lack of interest in
administration, or both, while personal and corporate income taxes are levied on narrow
bases at high rates. Sales taxes are levied in a cascading manner, thereby imposing tax
pyramiding and, in some cases, more than 100% full forward shifting (Khalilzadeh-
Shirazi and Shah, 1995; Bird, 1995; Shalizi and Squire, 1988).
Faced with mounting budget deficits and having to cut expenditures as far as is
prudently possible, particularly on public investment and social spending, a number of
developing countries have undertaken to restructure their system of taxation to seek
higher revenue or improve the revenue elasticity and buoyancy of the tax system. Other
goals of these reform processes have been to eliminate the disincentive effects of the
levels of taxation; to reduce the economic inefficiencies induced by the distortionary
taxation of assets and sectors; to protect the poorest of the poor from the tax net; and to
provide partial relief from the unwelcome effects of inflation  (Khalilzadeh-Shirazi and
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Shah, 1995). Thus revenue enhancement, economic efficiency, horizontal equity and
simplicity issues have dominated the world agenda on tax reform.
In pursuit of revenue enhancement, many countries are relying less on narrowly based
trade taxes and are emphasizing consumption taxes. To reduce the disincentive effects of
taxation, some countries have brought down the average and marginal effective tax rates
by eliminating ineffective tax preferences and thereby broadening the bases, while
levelling the rates. These measures, however, compromise vertical equity. As Musgrave
(1995) points out, broadening the bases may raise the threshold of taxation and have
fewer and lower tax rates, but it does not pay adequate attention to the distribution of
relative tax burdens across income groups. Some countries have attempted to protect the
poor by exempting or zero rating foods under a value added tax (VAT) and by raising the
threshold of taxes on personal income, urban property and agricultural land.
Despite the wave of tax reforms over the globe, and the remarkable similarity in the
broad directions of the reforms, a number of unresolved and controversial issues remain.
For example,  vertical equity and international income taxation have received only scanty
attention in many tax reforms. Emphasis on redistributive role of the tax system is
gradually waning - a direct consequence of the fact that tax evasion is so pervasive. The
proper role of progressive income taxation is an extensively debated issue, as is the
question of whether personal income tax should have fewer brackets and rates on account
of simplicity.  Although progressivity remains high on the political agenda in theory,
often the political will to enforce income tax compliance is lacking. And on the question
of replacing income taxes by broadly based consumption (expenditure) or cash-flow
taxes, perplexing philosophical and transitional issues continue to dominate current
discussions. Vertical equity is increasingly being perceived as an elusive goal and therefore
is being assigned a lower order of priority in tax reform. All recent attempts at tax reform
have curtailed tax preferences, especially for investment, but some economists argue
that certain tax incentives, such as investment tax credit, are desirable because they lower
the user cost of (new) capital, thereby encouraging greater capital formation.
Lessons for tax reform
Tax reform experiences to date offer some important insights into useful tax policy design
and institutional development. A detailed discussion of this issue is provided in
Khalilzadeh-Shirazi and Shah, (1995). A brief summary is presented below:
1. The value added tax should be an instrument of choice for developing countries
contemplating reform of their sales tax. According to Harberger (1990), there was no
such thing as value added tax (VAT) some fifty years ago. Since its introduction in
the early 1950s, however, VAT has become a fiscal innovation that has swept half of
the world, including many developing countries. The VAT has thus become an
instrument of choice for most developing countries contemplating reform of their
sales tax. A VAT can provide greater revenue, tax neutrality (economic efficiency)
and, under certain circumstances and to a limited extent, vertical equity.
2. The base of existing taxes should be broadened at the same time that tax administration
reform is carried out. Base broadening is compatible with a number of economic
objectives. It can increase revenues and improve the simplicity, neutrality and equity
of the tax system.
3. The use of the tax system for special tax preferences should be carefully evaluated.
Using the system to provide tax incentives (tax expenditures) usually causes a serious
drain on the national treasury by conferring windfall gains on existing activities or
by shifting resources to tax-preferred activities.
4. Tax reform must take into account the initial conditions at home and abroad. In
reforming their tax systems, developing countries are severally constrained not only
by their own institutional settings but also by the tax structure in capital-importing
countries. Moreover, the circumstances in many developing countries are usually
such that they would experience serious transitional difficulties if the tax system
were to be redesigned from scratch. Developing countries must therefore take into
account initial conditions at home and abroad.
5. The credibility of the tax regime is the key to the success of any tax reform. A stable
tax policy environment encourages businesses to take a longer-term perspective in
their finance and investment decisions. Making tax changes without giving adequate
consideration to transitional arrangements can undermine the credibility of the tax
regime. Therefore, transitional arrangements require much more careful analysis than
they have hitherto been given in developing countries. In addition, tax changes must
be presented as part of longer term strategy to improve the public sector environment
for the private sector. The tax regime will gain the confidence of business if more
attention is paid to the preparation and analysis of reforms, advance consultation,
providing a reasonable period of adjustment prior to implementation and ensuring
consistency of the reform measures.
6. The tax reform process must be well coordinated. Coordinated tax reform offers
significant advantage over isolated piecemeal tinkering with the tax system. A
coordinated reform ensures that individual tax changes will be consistent with the
central objective. For example, a reduction in tariffs without a corresponding increase
in other taxes, generally of a value added type, can increase the fiscal deficit and
exacerbate macroeconomic difficulties. Furthermore, to improve economic
performance in general, tax reform should be closely integrated with structural
adjustment measures.
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III.    Fiscal performance prior to 1983
The fiscal budget
A detailed assessment of the Ghanaian fiscal performance will not be complete without
first examining the structure and coverage of the fiscal budget and its respective
constituents. Ghana’s fiscal budget covers all governmental functions and activities at
national, regional and local levels. All government monies belong to the Consolidated
Fund from which all disbursements are made. On the revenue side are three broad
categories: tax revenue, non-tax revenue and grants. The expenditure side comprises
current and capital (development) expenditure.
Concerning the revenue side, taxes are further divided into indirect taxes and direct
taxes. The indirect taxes category comprises taxes on domestic goods and services and
taxes on foreign trade and transactions, while the direct taxes side comprises taxes on
income and property. Indirect tax estimates are arrived at by adjusting the current figures
for the expected rate of growth in domestic demand as well as changes in the volume and
composition of this domestic demand. Similarly, direct taxes on income and property are
adjusted in accordance with the expected growth of incomes, profits and employment.
Here, it is important to single out the role of the cocoa sector both as a foreign exchange
earner and vital revenue source of the government.
Non-tax revenues consist of fees, interests, profits and dividends, fines, penalties and
forfeitures, and rent from government property. Grants, which are essentially capital
receipts, include (largely) borrowing from abroad and local sources.
On the expenditure side are the recurrent and development budget. The recurrent
expenditure comprises expenditures on all governmental activities: general administration,
law and order, defence, community and social services, and direct government economic
activities. This category of expenditure also includes interest payments on public debt as
well as transfers or subventions to parastatal organizations. The development expenditure,
on the other hand, consists of outlays for acquisition of new capital assets, purchase of
existing capital goods and transfers to state-owned enterprises.
The Ghanaian fiscal system, up to 1985, was characterized by a persistent gap between
expenditures and revenues, with the gap widening during the fiscal expansion in the
mid1970s and narrowing in the more stable period of the second half of the 1960s. Table
1 shows the central government finances in levels and as percentages of GDP. Figure 1
displays the central government finances as percentage of GDP. Table 1 shows that the
budget in each year of 1960–1967 was in surplus, with the surplus reaching 4.1% of
GDP.
Table 1: Central government finances (1960–1993)
Year Current Total Fiscal balance Current Total  Fiscal
revenue expenditure revenue expenditure balance
(In million cedis) (as % of GDP)
1960 147 130 16 15.3 13.6 1.1
1961 161 156 5 15.2 15.2 0.5
1962 163 162 1 14.9 14.8 0.1
1963 184 176 8 15.3 14.6 0.6
1964 226 217 9 16.6 16.0 0.7
1965 295 235 60 20.1  16.0 4.1
1966 257 219 38 16.9 14.4 2.5
1967 263 261 3 17.5 17.3 0.2
1968 302 316 -14 17.8 18.6  -0.8
1969 332 370 -39 16.6 18.5 -1.9
1970 437 435 2 19.3 19.2 0.1
1971 450 461 -11 18.0 18.4 -0.4
1972 419 505 -86 14.9 17.9 -3.2
1973 444 553 -109 12.7 15.8 -3.1
1974 652 843 -191 14.0 18.1 -4.1
1975 815 1439 -624 15.4 27.2 -11.8
1976 1075 1868 -793 16.5 28.6 -12.3
1977 1539 2677 -1138 13.8 24.0 -10.2
1978 2186 3625 -1439 10.4 17.3 -6.9
1979 3015 4597 -1582 10.6 16.2 -5.6
1980 3264 6066 -2802 7.6 14.1 -6.5
1981 4539 9847 -5308 6.3 13.6 -7.3
1982 4643 10132 -5490 5.4 11.7  -6.3
1983 10241 15175 -4934 5.6 8.3 -2.7
1984 22641 27485 -4844 8.4 10.2  -1.8
1985 40311 47891 -7580 11.8 14.0 -2.2
1986 73625 73326 299 14.4 14.3 0.1
1987 111046 106987 4059 14.9 14.4 0.5
1988 153791 149880 3911 14.6 14.2 0.4
1989 214513 204161 10352 15.1 14.4 0.7
1990 267347 263960 3387 13.2 13.0 0.2
1991 390690 351515 39175 15.2 13.6 1.6
1992 396143 510813 -114670 14.8 19.1  -4.3
1993 664436 782872 -118436 23.7 27.9  -4.2
Source:Brown (1972).
GOG, Economic Survey (various issues).
GOG, Quarterly Digest of Statistics (various issues).
ISSER (1993).
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Figure 1. Central government finances, 1960–1993 (as percentage of GDP)
in 1965, and averaging 1.3% of GDP in 1960–1967. After 1967, the budget moved into
deficit and remained in deficit until 1985, except in 1970 when a surplus of some 0.1%
of GDP was achieved. The deficits gradually widened from an annual average of 2.8% in
1971–1974 to 11.4% in 1975–1977 and ranged between 1.8% and 7% in 1978–1985.
The relatively low deficit/GDP ratio of the 1971–1974 period was not due to any
improvement in the share of government revenue in GDP, since the latter declined by 4
percentage points during the period, but was due to the drop in the expenditure/GDP
ratio. The expenditure/GDP ratio declined from 19.2% in 1970 to 15.8% in 1973.
An interesting feature of the  government finances during the 1970–1982 period was
that the current revenue was insufficient to cover the current expenditure, part of which
had to be financed from capital receipts. In the 1972–1978 and 1979–1982 periods, for
example, current revenue could only cover some 54.9% and 56.9% of total expenditure,
respectively, leaving large deficits to be financed from capital receipts (Kusi, 1991). The
extremely poor fiscal performance in the period lies at the heart of the economic crisis
the country faced. As the expenditure-revenue gap widened amid limited non-inflationary
sources of finance, deficit financing became the principal source of the budgetary support,
causing the share of government borrowing from the domestic banking  system, mainly
from the central bank, to increase from 49% in 1970 to 86% in 1982 (Kusi, 1991). The
general monetization of the fiscal deficits and the resulting excess demand pressure
accelerated the inflation rate, which caused a high over-valuation of the cedi and eroded
real producer prices. This led to a drastic decline in agricultural production, especially
Table 2: Sources of government revenue 1960-1982 (in percent of total revenue)
Year Income and property taxes Foreign trade taxes Taxes on domestic Non-tax
goods and services  revenue
Personal Company Total1 Import Export Total Excise Sales Total3
income tax tax tax duty tax tax2
1960 6.0 4.2 10.2 30.5 25.9 56.4 - 7.7 12.8 20.6
1961 7.7 5.7 13.4 36.5 19.9 56.4 - 6.9 12.3 17.9
1962 8.6 6.3 14.9 37.2 15.9 53.1 - 5.8 16.3 15.6
1963 6.4 4.8 11.2 37.0 16.4 53.4 - 7.4 18.8 16.5
1964 12.8 12.3 25.1 30.2 13.9 44.1 - 6.2 17.3 13.5
1965 10.0 9.5 19.5 36.5 7.0 43.5 - 6.8 26.4 10.7
1966 9.5 10.5 20.0 29.4 6.3 35.7 - 9.8 32.5 11.9
1967 8.4 11.3 19.7 25.3 13.4 38.7 - 7.4 29.8 11.8
1968 9.4 10.2 19.6 18.6 23.3 41.9 - 7.4 28.2 10.4
1969 7.8 10.7 18.5 18.0 29.8 47.8 7.7 9.4 22.2 9.8
1970 6.7 7.7 15.4 18.3 36.1 54.4 6.7 7.4 19.1 11.1
1971 6.3 7.2 15.1 23.8 26.8 50.6 6.6 7.3 22.4 11.9
1972 8.9 8.2 21.3 13.6 28.5 42.1 10.0 7.5 21.7 14.9
1973 9.3 10.2 23.9 16.1 21.4 37.5 12.3 8.3 26.2 12.5
1974 8.4 10.3 20.1 16.5 27.0 43.5 9.9 4.6 21.8 14.6
1975 10.3 12.8 25.3 11.9 23.0 34.9 22.2 5.1 27.3 12.4
1976 8.7 11.5 22.3 12.0 25.7 37.7 25.0 4.9 29.8 10.2
1977 10.4 9.2 20.1 14.5 32.0 46.5 15.8 3.6 23.8 9.5
1978 8.5 7.0 15.7 15.9 43.2 59.1 10.9 3.3 16.7 8.4
1979 10.2 8.4 20.2 11.9 36.8 48.7 15.4 3.0 24.3 6.8
1980 11.7 11.8 26.1 13.1 12.2 25.3 31.8 6.4 39.0 9.5
1981 14.8 13.6 29.5 14.6 0.1 14.7 33.5 14.4 47.9 7.9
1982 16.1 14.3 32.3 17.4 0.1 17.5 30.7 5.3 35.6 14.5
Source:Brown (1972)
Government of Ghana, Economic Survey (various issues)
Government of Ghana, Quarterly Digest of Statistics (various issues)
1Includes other taxes on income and property
2Includes excise duty up to 1968
3Includes purchase tax, cocoa local duty and other output taxes
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cocoa, and a worsening of the balance of payments situation. Thus the persistent fiscal
deficits forced the government to absorb almost all the credit available in the economy,
crowding out private borrowers and causing severe inflation.
This series of problems is not, of course, unusual. The cycle of deficits leading to
monetary expansion leading to misaligned real prices (especially exchange rates) is quite
common (Younger, 1989), but the severe nature of the Ghanaian problem led to some
rather unusual developments. As Figure 1 shows, beginning from 1978, government
expenditure as a proportion of GDP, rather than increasing, began to decline sharply,
reaching 8% in 1983. Thus the deficits persisted only because revenues also declined.
Trends in revenue
Government revenue has generally been on the increase since 1960. As a percentage of
GDP, however, current revenue has declined since 1965, from a share of 20.1% in 1965
to 5.4% in 1982 (Table 1). Both the tax and non-tax revenue contributed to the decline.
As the entries in Table 2 show, indirect taxes were the most important sources of
government revenue, accounting for more than two-thirds, on average, of the total
government revenue in the 1960-1982 period, with tax revenue from international trade
providing the bulk of it. The share of international trade taxes in total government revenue
declined steadily, however, from 56.4% in 1960-1961 to 14.7% in 1981, caused by the
decline in revenue from both import tax and cocoa export duty (export duty is assessed
predominantly on cocoa exports). The import tax revenue declined from an average of
35.3% in 1960-1963 to 10.7% of total revenue in 1982, while revenues from cocoa export
duty declined sharply in the first half of the 1960s but resumed growth thereafter, reaching
43.2% of total government revenue in 1978. Revenues from cocoa export duty, however,
contributed nothing to total government revenue in 1981 and 1982 following the tripling
in 1981 of the cocoa producer price and the complete removal of export duty on cocoa in
1981 and 1982 (Kusi, 1991). The fall in import tax revenue was due to such factors as the
sluggish growth in non-oil imports (caused by the fall in export earnings and an  increase
in import bills on oil following the 1973/74 and late 1970s oil shocks), and the artificially
low value of imports in terms of domestic currency. Corruption and extensive tax evasion
also played a significant part in the decline of the share of import tax revenue in the total
revenue of the government.
Taxes on domestic goods and services (excise duty and sales tax), which accounted,
on average, for 15.6% of total government revenue in 1960–1964, had in 1977–1982
more than doubled their contribution (Table 2). Indeed, had it not been for the general
decline of the economy and the price control system, which resulted in large amounts of
potential revenue being lost through parallel market transactions, tax revenue from the
domestic goods and services would have expanded more than was realized.
Table 2 also shows that tax receipts from income and property increased steadily,
from 10.2% of total government revenue in 1960 to 21.3% in 1972, with some big jumps
in 1964 and 1969. Thereafter, the share fluctuated between 15% and 25% until 1980–
1982 when the share jumped to an average of 29.3% of total revenue. Over this period,
the relative shares of the major components of income and property taxes, i.e., personal
income and company tax, remained fairly stable, with each contributing some 9.3% of
total revenue each year over the period. Personal income tax, most of it deductible at
source through the pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) system was indeed the most reliable source
of government revenue although its contribution to total revenue was low. On the other
hand, revenue from company tax, property tax and self-employed tax tended to fall
considerably short of its potential due again to extensive evasion and lags in assessment
and collection.
Non-tax revenue contribution to total revenue also experienced a serious deterioration
in the period. From a share of 20.6% of total revenue in 1960, revenue from non-tax
sources steadily declined to 7.9% in 1981, and averaged some 12% in 1960–1982 (Table
2). This contribution was too low considering that the state was heavily involved in
various directly productive ventures, with the total number of state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) totalling 284 in 1980. Given the extensive involvement of the government in
direct production, one would have normally expected the state enterprises to generate
surpluses in the form of taxes, interests and dividend payments to finance additional
public investment. Instead the SOEs became a drain on the government budget. Their
poor performance was due to a multiplicity of factors, including the low level of capacity
utilization, overstaffing, price control, poor financial management, corruption and the
implicit assurance that state enterprises could always rely on government subsidies even
in the face of continual losses (Huq, 1989).
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IV. Tax reform and revenue performance,
1983-1993
The tax reform programme
In 1983 the Government of Ghana embarked on a series of fiscal and financial adjustments
intended to stimulate economic recovery. Major faces of the adjustment process have
been the reform of the tax system and measures to eliminate government budget deficits
through expenditure rationalization.  On the expenditure side, the policy matrix has been
designed to raise capital outlays in the context of a rolling three-year investment
programme, aimed at the rehabilitating the economic infrastructure and channelling more
resources to operations and maintenance. On the revenue side, government policy has
focused on tax reform with the view to removing the existing distortions and strengthening
economic incentives, particularly incentives for savings and investment. As well, attempts
have been made to enhance efficiency in the tax administration and equity in the overall
tax system.
The tax reform process can broadly be divided into three overlapping stages.
First stage: Restoring the tax base
In the initial stage of the fiscal adjustment, 1983–1984, the authorities felt that the tax
revenue would benefit from the impact of the exchange rate adjustments on receipts
from cocoa export taxes and import duties. In addition, the increased availability of
foreign exchange from foreign donors was expected to stimulate import expansion and
thus the base of import tax. The tax reform measures were, therefore, designed largely to
restore the tax base, which had been seriously eroded by the persistent over-valuation of
the domestic currency and the large divergence between the official prices (the base at
which taxes were assessed) and market prices (at which transactions take place). The
measures were also expected to widen the tax net, reduce evasion and lower the tax
burden. To begin with, a multiple exchange rate system was introduced in April 1983.
This system imposed surcharges on foreign exchange payments and bonuses on foreign
exchange receipts, and effectively resulted in two exchange rates – 23.38 cedis = US$1
and 29.98 cedis = US$1, respectively, from 2.75 cedis = US$1. In October 1983, the two
effective exchange rates were unified, resulting in an effective exchange rate of 30 cedis
= US$1. The exchange rate has periodically been adjusted since then, so that by 1993 it
had reached 720 cedis = US$1.
The pricing policy, which for a long time had been a mixture of administered (control)
prices for manufactured goods and market-determined prices for agricultural products,
supported officially by minimum guaranteed prices for cocoa and cereals, was deregulated
over the same period. For consumer goods, prices were allowed to fully reflect production
costs plus profit margins, while for cocoa, maize, rice and palm oil, a flexible producer
pricing system was adopted to maintain prices at levels that provided adequate incentives
to producers. Further, budgetary subsidies for consumer goods and public utilities were
gradually removed and fees, levies and charges for the various public sector services
were revised upward as part of the new cost recovery measures.
In addition to the exchange rate and price reform, the system for tax assessment for
import duties, sales and purchase tax were revised to make the bases of dutiable goods
reflect their full face value plus some surcharges. The basis for tax assessment for corporate
income tax was similarly changed from profits of the previous year to actual income
earned during the current year. In addition, the practice of advance payments of taxes at
the beginning of each quarter, which had caused extensive evasion, was discontinued.
Instead, corporate bodies and the self-employed were allowed to pay taxes at the end of
the quarter. In the case of personal income tax, the lowest tax-free bracket was raised and
the marginal rates lowered to reduce the average effective rates.
Second stage: Strengthening production incentives
The second stage of the tax reform process saw the introduction of an Investment Code
(PNDC Law 116, 1985) and a new Minerals Law (Minerals Commission Law, 1986).
The investment code provided for a wide range of tax incentives to domestic and foreign
investors. The code identified four areas – agriculture, manufacturing, construction and
buildings and tourism – as priority areas of investment. In these areas any enterprise
engaging in any activity qualified for certain tax benefits and incentives. The details of
the benefits and incentives granted under the code are provided in Table 3 and in addition
to these there were many others. First, where an enterprise with priority status undertook
or supported an approved programme of scientific research for the purposes of developing
or advancing the said enterprise, the capital expenditure in respect of such research was
fully tax deductible. Second, any enterprise located outside the Accra-Tema metropolitan
area also qualified for income tax reduction ranging from 15% to 40% depending on the
area of location. The code also provided for reduction or deferment of income tax payable
by enterprises in areas lacking in basic infrastructure and where the enterprise undertook
the costs of providing such infrastructure.
On its part, the Minerals Law modified eight existing laws, clarified mining rights
and set out new incentives for investors. The incentives included, among others, corporate
tax allowances, capital allowances under which companies could write off between 40%
and 100% of capital investment against tax, and permission for companies to use offshore
bank accounts to service foreign loans, dividend payments and expatriate staff
remuneration.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   




























   






























   




























   




















   
















   














   




















































   

































   

















   


































































































Third stage: Enhancing tax efficiency and equity
The focus of the tax reforms after 1985 was broadened to include the enhancement of
efficiency of the tax administration and equity of the tax system. The pace of the tax
reforms during this period was also increased and more attention was paid to the
strengthening of private sector incentives.
The effectiveness of tax administration is vital to attaining the objectives of every
reform of the tax structure. Until 1986, the primary function of tax administration –
facilitating and monitoring taxpayer compliance and preventing non-compliance – had
operated very inefficiently. The Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS) and the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) were unable to plan or carry out reforms to improve
productivity. Qualified staff were difficult to attract and retain, morale was low, corruption
was rife, and some staff held more than one job to compensate for the low wages. Low
yield and high costs of taxpayer inspections and audits were a prominent feature of the
tax administration. As a major part of the tax reform programme, a considerable number
of steps were taken to strengthen the role of the revenue institutions in achieving the
objectives of increasing revenue and changing the structure of the tax system to make it
more efficient and equitable. The most dynamic step taken was the conversion of the
IRS and CEPS into autonomous services with new organizational structures in line with
the state-owned enterprises in 1986. At the same time, the remuneration, career path and
other human resource issues of the new structures were reviewed and embodied in a
Collective Work Agreement. The agreement also established new incentive policies
including promotion procedures and training for the staff of the IRS and CEPS. These
initiatives were aimed at generating from within the new organizations the necessary
changes to improve productivity, particularly in the area of tax collection.
Between 1986 and 1992, the IRS itself operated with a ministerial powers alongside
the Ministry of Finance. In 1992, this full autonomy was partially reversed, and currently
the IRS is headed by a director who reports to the Minister of Finance. The IRS, however,
continues to have a supervisory control over the collection of revenue in the country. In
terms of  the functional reorganization of the revenue institutions, both revenue and
expenditure accounting have been detached from the Treasury and coordinated only by
regular returns submitted by the IRS and CEPS to the Secretariat, the Treasury and the
Central Bank (Terkper, 1994).
The move toward self-assessment of taxes has been slow as a result of the poor culture
for filing returns in the country. Both the IRS and CEPS have therefore been reviewing
their examination and audit practices. The IRS, for example, has begun a major review
of its taxpayer master file, using names extracted from the presumptive tax scheme it
operates for identifiable groups. The aim of this exercise is to further expand the tax base
and improve the equity of taxation of self-employed persons in the country. The CEPS,
for its part, is to extend its more rigorous field audit of domestic firms to cover the
operation of taxation of international trade.
Upon the advice of the World Bank in 1989, the government took the initiative to
computerize the tax administration management information systems and introduced a
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unique taxpayer identification number system.
On the direct side, the aim of the corporate tax reform has been the gradual reduction
of tax rates and the elimination of the distortions that arise from applying multitude of
tax rules to different form of capital financing and sectoral incomes. In 1986, the corporate
tax rate stood at 55%, with the exception of mining and manufacturing which faced a tax
rate of 50%. By 1991, the applicable rate for real estate, manufacturing and construction
had been slashed to 35%, while the rate for commerce, printing, and publishing was
reduced from 50% to 35% in 1992. The rate applied to banking also went down, from
50% in 1991 to 40% in 1992. By 1993, all rates had been reduced to 35%, with the
exception of the rate applied to the mining sector. That rate was reduced to 35% in 1994,
following the amendments to the Petroleum and Mining Law. In addition, the capital
depreciation allowances provided under the 1985 Investment Code were extended to all
enterprises in the manufacturing sector.
Regarding capital gains tax, the rates, until 1989, were: assets in use under 5 years,
55%; between 5 and 10 years, 45%; between 10 and 15 years, 35%; and between 15 and
20 years, 25%.  In 1990, these were changed to: assets in use under one year 50%; and
between 2 and 20 years,  2.5%. In 1991, a flat rate of 5% was introduced to replace the
progressive structure of the tax (GOG, 1988, 1991, 1992a), with income from mergers
and acquisitions and publicly traded shares exempted from capital gains tax. The reduction
was intended to reduce the impact of taxing the inflationary element in the disposition of
assets.
Prior to 1991, the tax on dividends was withheld at 30% and credited to any shareholder
who filed a return at the end of the year. However, given the poor record of filing annual
returns in the country, the withholding tax effectively became a 30% tax for most corporate
distributions of profit, creating an element of double taxation due to the original taxation
of corporate profits. In 1991, the withholding tax on dividend payments was converted
to a final tax and then reduced from 15% to 10% in 1992 (GOG, 1991, 1992a).
Significant changes were also introduced in the personal income tax system during
this period. Although the changes were meant to discourage the spurious allowances
granted under the former system, the fundamental goal was to lower the tax rates to
minimize the disincentives to increased productivity and entrepreneurship. In place of
the previous 17 tax brackets, 5 brackets were introduced in 1986 with new effective tax
rates that provided substantial relief to the low-income earners (Table 4). The changes
provided for a reduction of the top marginal rate of 60% (which previously applied to
annual chargeable income exceeding 75,000 cedis) to 55% applicable only when a
taxpayer’s annual chargeable income exceeds 180,000 cedis. For those earning the
minimum wage, the new rate of tax was only about half the rate paid in 1985. Taxpayers
could also claim additional relief for expenses incurred in their children’s education and
contributions to pension and social security. Personal income tax relief to unmarried
persons was also increased by 100%. For married persons filing separate tax returns, an
increase of some 92% in tax relief was granted. Additional tax relief was also provided
on end-of-service awards.
The income tax burden was further lowered during the 1987-1993 period through
substantial upward adjustments in personal allowances and the minimum tax-free income
threshold. Further increases in personal allowances at rates well in excess of expected
inflation were allowed during the period. In addition, the base of personal income tax
was broadened to include all allowances (comprising mainly allowances for housing,
transport, leave and meals) paid to employees in both the public and private sectors. To
offset the impact of this measure on disposable incomes, the top marginal rate of personal
income tax was reduced from 55% in 1990 to 25% in 1991, and then to 35% in 1993
(Table 4; GOG, 1991, 1994). By so doing, the top marginal rate of personal income tax
was made equal to the corporate tax rate. It was thought that such unification  would
minimize the shifting of income by individuals under tax avoidance and evasion schemes.
In 1992, the ranges of income covered by the tax bands were increased significantly to
Table 4: Personal income tax schedule, 1985 and 1993
1 9 8 5 1 9 9 3
Taxable income Marginal rate Taxable income Marginal rate
(cedis) (%) (cedis) (%)
0 -  5,000 Free First 150,000 Free
  5,001 -  7,000 5.0 Next 291,000 5
  7,001 -  9,000 7.5 Next 441,000 10
 9,001 - 11,000 10.5 Next 2,640,000 15
11,001 - 14,000 12.5 Next 10,560,000 25
14,001 - 16,000 15.0 Exceeding 14,082,000 35
16,001 - 19,000 17.0
19,001 - 22,000 20.0
22,001 - 25,000 23.0
25,001 - 30,000 25.0
30,001 - 35,000 30.0
35,001 - 40,000 35.0
40,001 - 45,000 40.0
45,001 - 50,000 45.0
50,001 - 60,000 50.0
60,001 - 75,000 55.0
Above 75,000 60.0
Source: World Bank (1985); Government of Ghana (1993).
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alleviate the burdensome effects of increased inflation and consolidation of all allowances
with salaries.
The tax reforms also affected the system of indirect taxation. The most important
changes in this area included the lowering of tariff rates and achieving horizontal and
vertical equity through a wider spread of the burden of indirect taxation. Beginning from
1987, all excise duties on products other than petroleum, beverages and tobacco were
abolished, with the revenue loss compensated for by an increase in the general sales tax
rate from 10% to 20% and subsequently to 25%. In 1989, the rate was reduced to 22.5%
and was lowered further to 17.5% in 1991. The sales tax rate on luxury items, however,
was raised from 20% in 1987 to 35% in 1988, and remained at this level through 1993. A
“super sales tax”, ranging from 75% to 100% of the c.i.f and ex-factory cost, was
introduced for very high-class luxury consumption goods in 1990. This  was eliminated
from the tax structure in 1992 because, even though the tax was to be levied on all luxury
consumption, its practical administration and implementation tended to apply only to
imports, thus increasing the effective rate of protection for local industries (GOG, 1992a).
Moreover, the high rates of the tax encouraged misclassification, evasion and avoidance
(Terkper, 1994). Efforts were also made to replace the “ring” system of sales tax collection
with a “credit” system.
The windfall gains on petroleum sales were also converted to a specific excise duty
on petroleum products. This was to ensure that revenue from petroleum products would
accrue to the budget in the event of a rise in world oil prices. In 1988, petroleum tax rates
were more than doubled and have since been marked upwards, reaching 35% of the
average retail price in 1990. In 1992 and 1993 fiscal years, however, petroleum excise
tax revenue fell short of the expected target due primarily to public resistance to the price
increases. The government contends that the increases in petroleum excise tax should be
regarded as only a part of a longer-term strategy to create a more equitable and broad-
based system of taxation.
 Regarding import duties, the view of the tariff policy was that the search for economic
efficiency would make an across-the-board increases undesirable. For this reason, the
special taxes levied on the local production of textiles, tobacco, alcoholic and non-alcoholic
beverages, etc., were made to apply to imports of such items, beginning from 1988. In
addition, import duty and sales tax applicable to local production of textiles were also
made applicable to imports of similar goods. The special taxes and import duties were to
represent the primary levies to protect local industries. However, in 1990, the special
taxes were compressed into a uniform rate of 10% as the authorities realized the possibility
of these variety of taxes perpetuating inefficiency in local production and rendering the
local industries internationally uncompetitive. At the same time, the import licensing
requirements were gradually removed and duty rates lowered by some 5 percentage
points, reducing the primary import tariff rate on most goods to 25% in 1991.
Revenue performance
Perhaps the most glaring impact of the fiscal adjustment is the tremendous increases in
government revenue of all sources. These increases, in turn, contributed to the restoration
of fiscal discipline. For example, the budget deficit was reversed from a deficit of 2.7%
of GDP in 1983 to a surplus of 1.5% in 1991. However, it became difficult to sustain this
impressive performance in 1992 and 1993. The budget moved back into a deficit,
amounting to 4.8% of GDP in 1992, but this was reduced to 2.9% in 1993 (GOG, 1988,
1994).
Total government revenue grew by more than 26 times between 1983 and 1993, causing
the revenue/GDP ratio to increase from 5.6% in 1983 to nearly 24% in 1993 (GOG,
1994). Tax revenue increased from 4.6% of GDP in 1983 to 12.7% in 1987. Thereafter,
the share declined  gradually to 11.6% in 1990 before rising sharply to 18% in 1993
(GOG, 1988, 1994).
Of the non-grant sources of revenue, taxes on domestic goods and services showed
the highest growth, with revenue from this source in 1993 exceeding 125 times the level
in 1983. Revenue from taxes on foreign trade and transactions in 1993 were 35 times the
level in 1983, while income and property tax revenue in 1993 was over 63 times its level
in 1983 (ISSER, 1993).
Between 1970 and 1980, taxes on foreign trade and transactions contributed, on
average, some 44% of the total government revenue. By 1981, the contribution of foreign
trade taxes to total revenue had fallen to below 15% (Table 2). The reform measures
introduced after 1982, however, led to a sharp rise in the share of foreign trade taxes in
total revenue to 48.3% in 1983 before declining steadily to 26.7% in 1993 (Table 5). The
tax reform process also led to a big change in the relative shares of the components of the
foreign trade taxes, i.e, import tax and export duty. Whereas in 1983 some 28.6% of the
total tax revenue was derived from export duty, by 1993 the share of export duty had
fallen to under 6%. On the other hand, the share of import tax receipts in total tax revenue
increased from 19.7% in 1983 to 23.8% in 1990 before declining to 21% in 1993 (Table
4). Thus, import tax replaced export duty as the major source of revenue originating
from foreign trade after 1987.
Since revenue from export duty is predominantly duty on cocoa exports, the decline
in the former was due to the decline in cocoa duty revenue, which itself was due to the
falling cocoa prices on the world market and the government’s policy to pay a realistic
producer price to cocoa farmers, particularly in 1981-1982 and the period after 1987.
The world market price of cocoa dropped from 2,300 cedis per tonne in July 1987 to
1,800 cedis per tonne in July 1988. The 1989 budget predicted that the 1988 price would
fall and become stable at 1,400 cedis per tonne but due to the unleashing of accumulated
stocks of cocoa by the major producers, prices tumbled to 1,045 cedis per tonne, causing
over 25% loss of cocoa export receipts and thus cocoa export tax revenue over the period
(Stryker, 1990).
The tax reform also produced a noticeable impact on the revenue from and composition
of taxes on domestic goods and services. In 1983, revenue from taxes on domestic goods
and services accounted for some 17.1% of total government revenue. By 1993 the share
had reached 34.3%, with most of the improvement occurring in the 1991-1993 period.
Excise tax revenue which contributed 22.3% to total revenue in 1984, was in 1993
contributing a mere 6.2%, with a dip in 1991 (Table 5). The decline in the excise tax




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































revenue was due to the re-classification of petroleum tax as a separate tax and the
conversion of excise duties on all products other than tobacco and beverages to sales tax.
The biggest increases in revenue over the period came from the contribution of petroleum
taxes. Originally included as part of excise duty, taxes on petroleum products became
full taxes in 1986 and, despite the authorities inability to raise the revenue anticipated
from this source in 1993, revenue from petroleum taxes increased from 4.9% of total
revenue in 1987 to 22.7% in 1993 (Table 5). These taxes  thus appear to have replaced
taxes on cocoa as the most important source of revenue for the government.
The contribution of taxes from income and property to total tax revenue was similarly
affected by the reform measures. In relation to total revenue, the share of taxes from
income and property increased from 16.9% in 1983 to 21.1% in 1987, and then jumped
to an all time record of 25.8% in 1988. Thereafter, the share declined gradually, reaching
16.6% in 1993 (Table 5). Generally, the lack of growth in direct taxes in developing
countries may reflect the relative strength of indirect taxes. However, in Ghana, it was
also likely to be the result of the reductions in the marginal rates of personal and corporate
taxes and the widening of the individual tax brackets.
From the point of view of the relative shares of its components, the structure of income
tax did not change much during the 1983-1993 period. It is important to notice, however,
that revenue from company taxes increased its contribution to total tax revenue from
7.4% in 1983 to 18% in 1988, while the share of personal income tax declined from
8.6% to 6.7% (Table 5). This development reflected the availability of foreign exchange,
which permitted large imports of essential inputs to support the recovery in the growth
of industrial production, and the abolition of the price control system, which permitted
producers to set prices at domestic market levels, thereby increasing sales value and thus
companies’ incomes and profits. The drop in the share of income tax revenue was largely
the result of an income tax policy that sought to reduce the tax burden on personal incomes.
Although taxes on incomes of self-employed persons expanded, the increases were very
slow compared with the reduction in taxes on employees’ incomes.
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V.   Measurement of revenue productivity
The relative composition of tax revenue has implications for revenue growth and stability
when it is considered that taxes may be primarily mobilized to finance government
expenditures, both recurrent and capital. A high revenue productivity is usually considered
as one of the criteria of a good tax system in developing countries. This productivity is
traditionally measured by the concepts of tax buoyancy and tax elasticity.
Tax buoyancy and elasticity
Changes in any individual tax revenue result from discretionary changes in the legal
rates and rules governing the tax, and/or endogenous changes in the base on which the
tax is imposed.  The base is affected by, among others, variations in GDP.  Therefore
growth in tax revenue in response to GDP growth can be decomposed into two
components: the “automatic” growth, and the growth resulting from “discretionary”
changes in the tax rates and rules.  The combined effect is known as the “buoyancy” of
the tax.  The automatic growth in the tax revenue alone, abstracting from discretionary
changes, is the elasticity of the tax. A high tax elasticity, i.e., a tax elasticity coefficient of
one or more, is said to be particularly desirable since it allows growth in expenditure to
be financed by raising tax revenue without recourse to the politically unpopular decision
to raise tax rates (Mansfield, 1972).
Conventionally, the elasticity of total tax revenue in relation to income has been
presented in aggregate models as a single number.  However, it is more realistic to visualize
the overall tax elasticity as a weighted average of the sum of the elasticities of individual
taxes that respond in diverse ways to changes in income.  This implies that an evaluation
of the overall tax elasticity must commence with an examination of the individual tax
elasticities.
Symbolically, Mansfield (1972) has defined these elasticities as follows:
Elasticity of total tax revenue to income:
Elasticity of kth individual tax to income:
Elasticity of kth individual tax to base:









= total tax revenue
T
k
= revenue from kth tax
Y = income (GDP)
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= base of kth tax
∆ = the discrete change in the variable associated with it.



































According to Equation 1, the elasticity of total tax revenue to income is equal to the
weighted sum of individual tax elasticities (where the weights are the fractional
distributions to total tax by each individual tax).
The elasticity of any individual tax may also be decomposed into the product of the








































































































which shows that the elasticity of total revenue to income in a system of n taxes depends
on the product of the elasticity of tax to base and base to income for each individual tax,
weighted by the importance of each tax in the overall tax system.
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Estimation of tax elasticity and buoyancy
Two methods have traditionally been employed to estimate tax elasticities. These are the
historical time-series tax data (HTSTD) adjusted to discretionary tax measures (DTMs)
and the unadjusted HTSTD with time trends or dummy variables as proxies for DTMs.
The HTSTD adjusted to DTMs approach
This approach attempts to eliminate discretionary tax changes (defined as the legal changes
in the tax rates, tax bases, tax allowances and credits, and of tax administrative efficiency)












T* = adjusted HTSTD to discretionary tax changes
B = tax base (or GDP in aggregate level)




The underlying functional relationship of Equation 4 is given as:
T
t
* = aBb1 (5)
In adjusting the HTSTD to discretionary effects, the usual practice has been to use either
the proportional adjustment (PA) technique or the constant rate structure (CRS) technique.
The PA method was originally developed by Prest (1962) and has since been used by
Mansfield (1972), Jeetun (1978), Sury (1985), Gillani (1986), Lambert and Suckling
(1986), and Osoro (1993).  In this method, a series of adjusted tax revenue is first obtained
by subtracting from the actual tax revenue in each year the budget estimate of the revenue
impact of discretionary changes in that year. The series is further adjusted by excluding
the continuing impact of each discretionary change on future year’s tax revenue as given
in Equation 6.
Tij = T j −1, j .












= the actual tax revenue in the jth year
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ij




= Tj-Dj (where Dj is the revenue effect - positive or negative - in the jth year
of the discretionary tax changes in that year)
The CRS method, on the other hand, requires data on income bracket (or commodity)
rates and sufficiently disaggregated information on the growth and distribution of the
reported tax bases (see Bahl, 1972; Andersen, 1973; Chelliah and Sheetal, 1974; Choudhry,
1975).  If such disaggregated information is available, then a constant rate base
representing a hypothetical tax revenue under a system assumed to remain unchanged
during the period under review can be constructed as follows:
(Tt





T* = adjusted HTSTD to discretionary changes
R
io
= the base-year statutory tax rate on the ith income bracket (or commodity)
B
it
= reported tax base in the ith income bracket (or commodity) in the tth year
n = number of income brackets (or commodities)
A major problem with the PA and CRS techniques is that they are unable to completely
adjust the HTSTD to discretionary changes.  For its part, the PA method uses budget
estimates of discretionary tax changes that are difficult to obtain in many developing
countries. The CRS technique, on the other hand, requires information on the distribution
of tax bases by rate categories, which are also not readily available.  The result is that the
effective tax rates of the broad income brackets (or commodity groups) that are empirically
used assume a constant interclass (on intergrouping) distribution of the tax base throughout
the period under review.  Clearly, the validity of this assumption weakens as the number
of the income classes or commodity groups reduces due to aggregation.  Furthermore,
Ehdaie (1990) has pointed out that both the PA and CRS techniques incorporate only the
discretionary tax changes resulting from changes in statutory tax rates, thereby ignoring
the own- and cross-DTMs indirect responses of tax revenues and the impact of changes
in the degree of tax evasion, administrative efficiency, tax bases, and tax credits and
allowances. However, the technique suggested by Ehdaie itself suffers from the fate of
incomplete adjustment for the DTMs, arising from the fact that the base year values used
28 RESEARCH PAPER 74
in his approach include the revenue effects of the DTMs.
Choudhry (1979) has argued that in some situations, the CRS technique becomes
inefficient.  First, where a tax system has many progressive elements, the CRS technique
does not guarantee that the estimated tax elasticity will be larger (or smaller) than that of
the tax buoyancy even when discretionary changes produce negative (or positive) effects.
Second, where tax bases grow at the same rate, there is the possibility that the elasticity
estimate will fail to detect the effects of discretionary changes.
The unadjusted HTSTD with proxies for DTMs approach
This approach estimates tax elasticity directly from HTSTD using time trends or dummy
variables as proxy for DTMs. Choudhry (1979) employs a divisia index method (DIM)
in which time trends are introduced as proxy for DTMs in the tax revenue and tax base
functions. The approach starts with the following function:


















where log D(n) is the index of discretionary tax measures.
To obtain the elasticity estimates, the index of discretionary tax measures is adjusted
by using the following formula:
Et = Zt −
log D(n)







= tax buoyancy (obtained by regressing actual tax revenue on
GDP using logarithm form equation)
log D(n) = divisia index of discretionary tax revenue
log B(n)/B(0) = index of automatic growth of the proxy tax base
The problem with the DIM is that the formula derived to estimate the tax elasticity is
a line integral and, in practical application, its discrete version is used, causing bias in
the estimate of the revenue impact of discretionary changes. The bias can result in over
or underestimating the tax elasticity depending on whether the discretionary tax changes
produce positive or negative revenue effects.  (For the derivation and proof of the formula
and its implications see Choudhry, 1979: 87-121).
In an alternative approach, Chand and Wolf (1973), Khan (1973), and Artus (1974)
incorporate one dummy variable (simple or mixed) as a proxy for each of the DTMs
introduced during the periods of their review to estimate tax elasticity by means of a
single-equation model of the form:





T = tax revenue
B = tax base (or GDP in aggregate level)
D
i





The estimate of tax elasticity obtained from this approach may not be precise and
reliable because of the creation of potential multicollinearity problems resulting from
the inclusion of more than one dummy variable into the tax function.  Ehdaie (1990) has
argued that the degree of precision and reliability of the elasticity estimate are inversely
related to the degree of multicollinearity, which in turn depends greatly on the time
interval that existed between two successive discretionary actions taken by the tax
authorities.  This implies that obtaining a precise and reliable estimate of tax elasticity by
means of this approach is empirically impossible, particularly when there are frequent
discretionary tax changes during the review period.
The approach adopted in this study to estimate the tax elasticities is the HTSTD
adjusted to DTMs using the proportional adjustment technique. The starting point is
Equation 2, which shows that the elasticity of any individual tax is a product of the
elasticity of the tax to its base and the elasticity of the base to income. Accordingly, we
proceed to estimate the elasticity of the tax to its base by using the traditional model as
expressed in Equation 4. That is:
log (T*
t










)  = elasticity of the tax to its base.















 = elasticity of the tax base to income
Finally, the elasticity of the tax to income (E
T
) is obtained as :
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The tax buoyancy is estimated by running an ordinary least squares regression of:
Log (T
i






 + ut (13)
where T
i 
is the unadjusted tax revenue, and w
i
 the tax buoyancy.
VI. The elasticity of the Ghanaian tax system
Proxy tax base
Estimation of tax elasticity requires a specification of the potential proxy or tax bases
and time- series data on the individual taxes and GDP. The World Bank (1984) in
estimating the elasticity of the Ghanaian tax system for the period 1970/71–1980/81
considered GDP, private consumption expenditure, non-oil imports and cocoa export
receipts as proxy bases for income tax, taxes on domestic production and consumption
(i.e., excise tax and sales), import duty and export tax, respectively. In this study elasticities
are estimated separately for company tax and personal income tax. For company tax, the
specified proxy base is corporate current income (defined to include incomes from the
sectors with the highest concentration of corporate activities, i.e., logging, manufacturing,
mining, construction, water and electricity, and finance). The proxy base taken for personal
income tax is current personal income (defined to include employees emoluments, both
public and private, plus incomes from the trading and commercial sectors as proxy measure
of the self-employed income). Since excise tax is levied only on manufactured goods in
Ghana, the potential proxy base is income (value added) from the manufacturing sector.
For sales tax, import tax and cocoa export duty, the proxy bases are the same as those
specified by the World Bank, i.e., private consumption expenditures, non-oil imports
(adjusted for capital import exemptions for the relevant years) and cocoa export receipts,
respectively.
Petroleum tax is excluded from the empirical analysis because prior to 1986 petroleum
tax receipts were treated as part of excise duty revenue. Hence no time-series data on
taxes on petroleum for the period leading to 1986 are available. This leaves us with time-
series annual data for eight years, which is too short for any meaningful tax elasticity
estimation.
Data
Data for the empirical analysis were obtained from two main sources, the Government
of Ghana and the International Monetary Fund. The Ghana Statistical Service (GSS)
publishes Quarterly Digest of Statistics (QDS), which contains, among others, time-
series (annual) data on economic classification of central government revenue and national
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accounts. In addition, the Ministry of Finance publishes annually the Budget Statement
and Economic Policy of the Government, which usually contain data on the major sources
of government revenue and expenditures. Data on individual and overall tax revenue,
GDP and potential tax bases were obtained from these publications. The IMF publishes
annually the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, which also contains time series
data on central government operations of member countries. Data from this source were
used to supplement those obtained from the GSS Quarterly Digest of Statistics.
Estimated tax buoyancies and elasticities
Point estimates of tax buoyancies and elasticities for the major taxes and the overall tax
system for the 1970–1982 and 1983-1993 periods are presented in Table 6. All the
coefficients are significant  at the 5% level and have the expected signs, except the
coefficients of the export tax buoyancy and elasticity for the 1970–1982 period. The
adjusted coefficients of determination ( R 2,' s ) indicate that, in general, changes in the
proxy bases explain over 80% of the changes in the tax revenues.  The reported DW
statistics also indicate the absence of autocorrelation in all the regressions.
The overall tax system
The coefficients in Table 6 show that the tax reform measures of the 1983–1993 period
had a tremendous positive effect on the productivity of both the individual taxes and the
overall tax system. In the 1970–1982 period, all the individual taxes, except excise duty,
had estimated buoyancies of less than unity, thereby causing the total tax system to have
a buoyancy of 0.72. During the tax reform period of 1983–1993, however, all the individual
taxes, except excise duty and cocoa export duty, showed buoyancies of more than unity,
causing the buoyancy of the overall tax system to increase to 1.29. Compared with the
1970–1982 period the tax buoyancy increased by 79.9% in the 1983–1993 period.
The estimated income elasticity of the overall tax system for 1970–1982 was very
low, 0.71, brought about because all the individual taxes, except for excise duty, had
estimated elasticities of less than unity. The income elasticity of the excise tax was
estimated at 1.16. In the 1983–1993 period, however, the estimated income elasticities
for all the individual taxes, except the cocoa export duty, were more than unity, thereby
causing the overall tax system to have an elasticity of 1.22. This represents an increase of
69.5% over the estimated income elasticity for the overall tax system in the 1970-1982
period.
A comparison of the estimated buoyancies and elasticities of the overall tax system
and of the individual taxes in each period shows small differences. For the overall tax
system, the differences were 1.6% in 1970–1982 and 5.8% in 1983–1993. For the
individual taxes, the differences were all less than 10% in both periods, except for excise
tax in 1970–1982 where the elasticity exceeded the buoyancy by 10.6%.
Some studies have attributed the differences between tax buoyancy and elasticity to
the contribution of changes in the discretionary measures. In this study, the differences
Table 6: Estimated tax buoyancies and elasticities*
Tax category Buoyancy Elasticity Difference
(percentage)
Pre-tax reform period, 1970–1982
Overall tax system    0.7197    0.7082 1.5979
(11.4325), R 2=0.89; DW=1.83 (10.7714); R 2=0.89; DW=1.88
Personal income tax  0.8879  0.8664 2.4214
(9.8821); R 2=0.91; DW=1.95 (9.1102); R 2=0.89; DW=2.10
Company tax  0.8095  0.8176 -1.0006
(5.9854); R 2=0.84; DW=1.85 (5.9989); R 2=0.89; DW=2.10
Sales tax1  0.6876  0.6801 1.0908
(3.9845); R 2=0.82; DW=1.90 (3.9324); R 2=0.79; DW=1.93
Excise tax    1.0497    1.1612 -10.6221
(15.4403); R 2=0.95; DW=2.10 (17.3209); R 2=0.97; DW=2.00
Import tax2    0.6042  0.5853 3.1281
(11.6652); R 2=0.89; DW=1.91 (9.4518); R 2=0.87; DW=1.91
Cocoa export duty  -0.5010  -0.5221 4.2116
(-2.4039); R 2=0.94; DW=1.79 (-2.9675); R 2=0.98; DW=1.91
Tax reform period, 1983–1993
Overall tax system    1.2948    1.2200 5.7764
(25.6601); R 2=0.93; DW=1.99 (25.0023); R 2=0.93; DW=1.98
Personal income tax    1.1939    1.0828 9.3063
(13.4427); R 2=0.95; DW=2.00 (13.9879); R 2=0.93; DW=1.98
Company tax  1.3564  1.3227 2.4866
(7.5155); R 2=0.95; DW=1.91 (7.5002); R 2=0.95; DW=1.90
Sales tax*    1.7089    1.5877 7.0936
(16.9875); R 2=0.96; DW=2.10 (14.5671); R 2=0.95; DW=1.99
Excise tax  0.9173  0.9941 -8.3724
(8.2365); R 2=0.89; DW=1.87 (9.1007); R 2=0.90; DW=1.92
Import tax**    1.3173    1.2072 8.3580
(17.7865); R 2=0.94; DW=2.00 (16.9987); R 2=0.94; DW=1.99
Cocoa export duty  0.8267  0.7498 9.3020
(4.9876); R 2=0.95; DW=1.85 (3.9987); R 2=0.93; DW=1.91
Percentage change in 1983–1993
Overall tax system 79.9 69.5
Personal income tax 34.5 25.0
Company tax 67.6 61.8
Sales tax1 148.5 133.4
Excise tax -12.6 -14.4
Import tax2 116.7 105.0
Cocoa export duty 265.0 243.6
* t-values in parentheses; ** On domestic manufactured goods; *** Includes import duty, sales and purchase
tax on imported goods.
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Table 7: Budget estimates of tax revenue and actual outcomes, 1970-1993
Year Budget estimates Actual Outcomes Comparison
(million of cedis) (million of cedis)
Total DTMS Revenue Revenue Difference 2 as 5 as 3 as 5 as
revenue (unadjusted (adjusted) (3-4) % of 1 % of 3 % of 1 % of 2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1970 437 62 388 336 52 14.2 13.4 88.8 83.9
1971 481 42 396 359 37 8.7 9.3 82.3 88.1
1972 459 28 357 331 26 6.1 7.3 77.8 92.9
1973 462 47 388 347 41 10.2 10.6 84.0 87.2
1974 640 113 557 467 90 17.6 16.1 87.0 79.6
1975 704 66 713 653 60 9.4 8.4 101.3 90.9
1976 940 102 965 874 91 10.8 9.4 102.7 89.2
1977 1057 41 1389 1349 40 3.9 2.9 131.4 97.6
1978 1437 22 2002 1980 22 1.5 1.1 139.3 100.0
1979 3025 460 2810 2424 386 15.2 13.7 92.9 83.9
1980 3639 373 2955 2630 325 10.2 11.0 81.2 87.1
1981 4087 509 4182 3734 448 12.4 10.7 102.3 88.0
1982 4380 89 3968 3881 87 2.0 2.2 90.6 97.8
1983 10117 3689 8434 6368 2066 36.5 24.5 83.4 56.0
1984 19527 6656 17830 13637 4193 34.1 23.5 91.3 62.9
1985 39900 13242 31841 20056 11785 33.2 37.0 79.8 89.0
1986 71281 23664 61587 42419 19168 33.2 31.0 86.4 81.0
1987 92494 14471 95400 82521 12879 15.6 13.5 103.1 89.0
1988 115853 12271 125779 114735 11044 10.6 8.8 108.6 90.0
1989 171219 27264 179139 155965 23174 15.9 12.9 104.6 85.0
1990 221201 25237 214254 192045 22209 11.4 10.4 96.9 99.0
1991 325713 66875 290529 239035 51494 20.5 17.7 89.2 77.0
1992 364263 44240 336096 297607 38489 12.1 11.4 92.3 87.0
1993 540608 122707 503395 406456 96939    22.7    19.3 93.1 79.0
Source: Government of Ghana, The Annual Estimates (various issues); Quarterly Digest of Statistics (various
issues); ISSER (1994: 95)
must be interpreted with caution because they don’t capture fully the effects of the
discretionary tax changes. As the entries in Table 7 show, for both the 1970–1982 and
1983–1993 periods, the budget estimates of discretionary tax changes (column 2) differed
substantially from the actual discretionary outcomes (column 5), even for periods such
as 1975–1978, 1981 and 1987–1989, when the actual tax outcomes (unadjusted) exceeded
the budget estimates. Also the share of the budget estimates of discretionary changes in
total budget estimates (column 6) differed from the share of the actual discretionary
changes in actual tax revenue (column 7). This underscores the fundamental weakness
of the PA method employed to adjust the tax revenues for discretionary changes.
The fact is that individual tax systems, tax revenue, tax bases and GDP are all
interrelated. Variations in an individual tax revenue can therefore be traced not only to
variations in its own tax system through discretionary tax changes, but also to endogenous
changes in its base. The base, in turn, is endogenously affected by changes in its own and
other tax systems through the price mechanism, changes in investment, savings and income
(Ehdaie, 1990). While the PA method may succeed in capturing the direct effect of the
discretionary changes in statutory tax rates, the indirect and cross effects of such
discretionary changes on its own tax system and on other tax systems and changes in the
degree of tax evasion and administrative efficiency cannot be captured, thereby leaving
the actual tax outcomes to be inadequately adjusted for the discretionary changes.
The revenue performance in 1970–1982 relative to the performance in 1983-1993
was low and lies at the heart of the estimated low buoyancies and elasticities during the
period. As Table 8 shows, beginning from 1970 tax revenue declined steadily from 16.0%
of GDP to 4.1% in 1982. Thereafter, the declining trend was not only reversed but assumed
an increasing trend, reaching 9.2% of GDP in 1985 and averaging some 12% in 1986–
1992. In 1993, tax revenue reached 18.0% of GDP, the highest level recorded since
1960. This development implied that whereas an increasing proportion of the incremental
GDP was transferred to the government in the form of revenue in 1983-1993, a decreasing
proportion of the incremental GDP was ceded to the government as tax revenue in the
1970–1982 period.
The low productivity of the tax revenue in the 1970–1982 period could be attributed
to a number of factors. The first relates to the collapse of the country’s foreign trade
during the period. Tax revenue from international trade declined from 10.5% of GDP in
1970 to 0.9% in 1982, brought about mainly by the decline in cocoa production and
export (the major foreign exchange earner at the time) and the resultant compression in
imports. Cocoa production declined by about 55.6% between 1970 and 1983, so despite
the government’s increasingly high “tax” on cocoa exports implied by the low real
producer prices, the overall tax revenue from cocoa exports declined. The reduction in
imports, caused by the decline in exports reduced the tax base for import tax, leading to
a decline in import tax revenue as well.
Apart from the reduction in both the export and import volume, the over-valuation of
the cedi also contributed to the decline in real tax revenues in the 1970–1982 period. The
exchange rate for the cedi was fixed at 1.15 cedis=US$1 in February 1972; this remained
in force until 1978, causing the cedi to become highly over-valued. Taking 1973 as a
base year, for example, Christney (1985) estimated that by 1978 the cedi was over-
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Table 8: Sources of government revenue, 1960-1993 (as percentage of GDP)
Year Personal Company Excise Sales Petroleum Import Export Nontax Total
income tax tax tax tax tax tax tax revenue revenue
1960 0.92 0.64 - 1.18 - 4.68 3.97 3.94 15.33
1961 1.21 0.90 - 1.08 - 5.73 3.13 3.67 15.72
1962 1.28 0.94 - 0.86 - 5.55 2.37 3.90 14.90
1963 0.98 0.73 - 1.12 - 5.64 2.50 4.27 15.24
1964 2.12 2.05 - 1.03 - 5.05 2.29 4.09 16.63
1965 2.01 1.91 - 1.36 - 7.33 1.40 6.08 20.09
1966 1.60 1.78 - 1.65 - 4.96 1.06 5.84 16.89
1967 1.47 1.97 - 1.30 - 4.42 2.35 5.97 17.48
1968 1.66 1.81 - 1.31 - 3.31 4.13 5.54 17.76
1969 1.29 1.78 1.28 1.56 - 2.98 4.95 2.75 16.59
1970 1.29 1.49 1.30 1.44 - 3.54 6.98 3.31 19.35
1971 1.13 1.30 1.20 1.32 -  4.29 4.82 3.95 18.01
1972 1.33 1.21 1.49 1.11 - 2.02 4.24 3.49 14.89
1973 1.17 1.29 1.56 1.05 - 2.04 2.71 2.85 12.67
1974 1.18 1.44 1.38 0.64 - 2.31 3.78 3.26 13.99
1975 1.58 1.97 3.42 0.80 - 1.84 3.55 2.27 15.34
1976 1.44 1.90 4.11 0.80 - 1.98 4.24 2.01 16.48
1977 1.43 1.26 2.17 0.50 - 2.00 4.40 1.99 13.75
1978 0.88 0.73 1.13 0.34 - 1.65 4.51 1.18 10.42
1979 1.09 0.90 1.65 0.32 - 1.27 3.93 1.52 10.68
1980 0.89 0.90 2.42 0.49 -  0.94 0.93 1.06 7.63
1981 0.93 0.85 2.09 0.90 - 0.83 0.01 0.64 6.25
1982 0.86 0.77 1.65 0.29 - 0.57 0.00 1.23 4.79
1983 0.48 0.41 0.83 0.35 - 0.76 1.59 1.15 5.57
1984 0.63 0.78 1.87 0.42 - 0.92 1.80 1.95 8.37
1985 0.89 1.33 2.10 0.81 - 1.40 2.67 2.56 11.76
1986 0.92 1.89 2.05 1.08 1.29 1.87 2.77 2.54 14.41
1987 1.09 1.93 1.72 1.77 0.74 1.71 3.62 2.32 14.90
1988 1.06 2.63 1.43 1.92 0.81 1.62 2.33 2.84 14.64
1989 0.89 2.30 1.34 2.39 1.06 2.29 2.20 2.66 15.13
1990 0.83 1.61 1.13 2.50 1.25 1.77 1.29 2.77 13.15
1991 0.70 1.51 1.02 2.04 2.83 1.77 1.23 4.08 15.18
1992 0.99 1.53 1.19 2.16 3.09 1.90 1.44 2.51 14.81
1993 1.63 1.98 1.47 3.25 5.36 2.91 1.36 5.70 23.66
Source: Brown (1972);  GOG, Economic Survey (various issues);  GOG, Quarterly Digest of Statistics (various
issues);  ISSER (1993).
valued by 250%, implying that exporters using the official channels were effectively
taxed while importers received substantial premiums. In 1978, the cedi was devalued by
58%, but this did little to stem the appreciation of the real exchange rate so that by 1982
the exchange rate was overvalued by 816% (World Bank, 1984). This high over-valuation
of the cedi caused incentives to shift from export to import trade and also encouraged
black market and smuggling of export commodities to neighbouring countries. As imports
became extremely cheaper, demand for them far outstripped the available foreign
exchange, forcing the government to resort to import controls through a system of import
licensing and administrative controls. In the end, only a very small volume of imports
was possible. Meanwhile taxes were levied on the cedi value of imports and exports, but
these values were not inflating with the rest of the economy so taxes based on them
significantly eroded in real terms.
The reluctance of the authorities to adjust the exchange rate to its equilibrium level
was accompanied by a system of price controls. In April 1982, the official price list,
published in two volumes, contained 1,900 prices, with many items having separate
control prices depending on size, make and quality. The consequence of the price control
system was that demand for all goods exceeded supply. The incoherent attempts to enforce
the price control policy, coupled with the over-valued exchange rate and absence of
taxes and subsidies to reflect in prices the actual scarcity, caused a significant expansion
of the black market economy (where transactions are non-taxable), forcing the structure
of the formal markets in the economy to collapse. The impact of the price control system,
the over-valuation of the exchange rate and the resultant black market economy was
tragic. It deprived the government not only of large amounts of foreign exchange through
official channels, but much needed revenue in the form of export duty, import tax and
sales tax. It also affected the distribution of income in the society.
Finally, tax evasion, laxity in tax collection, and the significant time lag between tax
assessment and tax collection in an environment of rapid inflation were also important
factors explaining the decline in tax revenue in proportion to GDP in the pre-reform
period.
The high productivity of tax revenue in the 1983–1993 could be attributed mainly to
the effects of the exchange rate reform. Since the over-valued exchange rate had been
the principal cause of the collapse of the country’s international trade, and thus the bases
of the traded goods taxes, the government introduced a major reform in this area, as we
saw earlier. The exchange rate reform was supported by the introduction of foreign
exchange auctions and foreign exchange bureaus (where foreign exchange could be freely
bought and sold) as well as price and import liberalization, which effectively ended price
controls and abolished the import licensing system. These developments worked to remove
the restrictive mechanisms and market distortions existing in the economy, thereby
restoring the tax bases that had been extensively eroded in the 1970–1982 period. The
measures also signalled a shift of incentives to domestic production and export, which
contributed significantly to the recovery in the export trade, particularly the export of
gold, timber and many nontraditional goods. The devaluations also meant a larger local
currency value of both exports and imports, thereby increasing the traded goods tax
base. They also allowed the government to increase the producer price of cocoa, which
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encouraged more cocoa exports (and a larger tax base), and to reinstate the cocoa export
duty that had been abolished in the 1981–1982 period. In addition, the foreign exchange
auctions together with the scrapping of the import licensing system contributed to the
stimulation of imports, and thus the import tax revenue.
Apart from the exchange rate, trade and price liberalization, the increased flow of
foreign loans and remittances from abroad also contributed to the increased flow of
imports, and thus the base for import tax. The import recovery also allowed not only
essential raw materials, capital goods and spare parts needed to improve the rate of capacity
utilization, particularly in the manufacturing sector, but also stimulated domestic trading
activities, thereby expanding domestic production and consumption and increasing the
bases of both excise and sales taxes.
Finally, the better enforcement of the tax laws and pursuance of measures aimed at
maximizing the efficiency of tax collection contributed significantly to the high tax revenue
productivity in 1983–1993. In particular, the conversion of the two revenue institutions,
IRS and CEPS, into autonomous organizations with improved employment conditions
for their staff and freedom from the civil service bureaucracy, enabled the institutions to
attract requisite professional staff needed to tackle the challenges of administration brought
by the improved tax system. This had a positive impact on revenue mobilization, especially
in the period after 1986.
Personal income tax
The estimated income tax buoyancy for the 1970–1982 period was 0.89 and the elasticity
was 0.87. Compared with the corresponding coefficients of 1.19 and 1.08 for the 1983–
1993 period (Table 6), one observes that the income tax performance was low in 1970–
1982. Although personal income tax increased steadily from 1.3% of GDP in 1970 to
1.6% in 1975, it declined sharply thereafter, reaching under 0.5% of GDP in 1983 (Table
8).
The low productivity of personal income tax during the 1970–1982 period stemmed
partly from the low taxation of non-wage income earners, especially income earners in
the trading and commercial sector, but mainly from the decline of real wages of employees
in the formal sector. The World Bank (1984) analysis of income tax collection according
to sources for the period 1977/78–1979/80, for example, indicates that wages and salaries
of employees in the formal sector accounted for 84% of the total income tax collection,
while the self-employed and standard assesses contributed only 16%. Since in an
environment of rapid inflation profits keep pace or move ahead of the price increases
while wages and salaries lag behind, one would have expected that income tax from the
self-employed workers, the majority of whom were in commerce and trade, should have
risen relative to tax on wage income, but the use of official control prices in computing
the profits and taxable income of the self-employed workers precluded their tax liability
to inflate with the economy. The ease with which income tax on salaried workers is
assessed and collected, i.e., based on the PAYE system, provided another explanation for
the less concerted attention to taxes on self-employed incomes. Although the share of the
self-employed income tax in the total income reached 58% in 1982/83, this was not due
to any improvement in tax collection from this source since the period witnessed a drastic
decline in the share of tax on wage incomes.
The decline in wages and salaries of workers in the formal sector, resulting from the
government’s minimum wage legislation, was largely to blame for the low buoyancy
and elasticity of income tax from 1970 to 1982. Governments in Ghana have implemented
minimum wage legislation since 1960, when the wage rate was fixed at 0.65 cents per
day. Since then, the rate has been revised upwards several times, but the policy not only
failed to maintain the real wages of workers at subsistence levels, it also discriminated
more against skilled personnel. Since 1974, increases in the nominal wages failed to
keep pace with the rate of inflation. The result was that, in nominal terms, the average
wage rate rose at an average of 28.4% in 1974–1983. In real terms, however, average
wages actually declined at the rate of 13.3% per annum (Ewusi, 1987). Besides the
compression of the wage structure, the differential between the highest and lowest paid
in the civil service, where most wage and salary earners were employed, fell to 1.8:1
compared with the ratio of 10:1 in the private sector (Jonah, 1989). Given the severity of
the situation, many skilled personnel left the civil service to work in neighbouring
countries, where conditions were relatively better, or left their professions for trading,
causing the base of employee income tax to shrink. The existence of a multitude of non-
taxable allowances (leave, canteen, transport, housing, inducements, medical, education,
clothing, etc.) was also an important factor underpinning the low buoyancy and elasticity
in the period.
Compared with the estimated coefficients for the 1970–1982 period, the buoyancy
and elasticity of personal income tax increased by 34.5% and 25%, respectively, in the
1983–1993 period, much less than the growth experienced in the overall tax system over
the same period. The modest growth in personal income tax revenue in 1983–1993 was
a reflection of the personal income tax policy of the period, which was generally directed
at reducing the income tax burden. Starting from 1986, the income tax brackets were
reduced from 16 to 5. In addition, the top marginal rate of 60%, which in 1985 applied to
annual chargeable income exceeding 75,000 cedis, was successively reduced, reaching
35% in 1993 and applicable to annual taxable income exceeding 2,206,242 cedis in
terms of 1985 value. These were in addition to the substantial tax reliefs granted to the
low-income earners and married couples. For example, in 1985, the standard personal
relief for a married couple was 6,500 cedis. By 1993 this had increased to 23,500 cedis
in terms of 1985 value. Over the same period, the tax rates applied to the lower income
earners were also revised downwards. Figure 2 compares the effective income tax rates
in 1985 to the rates applied in 1993. As the figure shows, the income tax reform reduced
the progressivity of the effective tax rates. Whereas in 1985, the effective tax rates ranged
from 6% for incomes up to 25,000 cedis to 47% for incomes of 240,000 cedis and above,
the corresponding effective tax rates in 1993 were from 0.1% to 9.4%, implying relatively
lower real income tax liabilities in 1993. The decline in the effective tax rates was even
more substantial for the higher income earners. For example, the effective tax rate paid
by a married person with an annual income of 240,000 cedis was 47% in 1985. In 1993,
a married person with an annual income equivalent to 240,000 cedis (at 1985 prices)
paid an effective tax of less than 10%, representing a reduction of some 37 percentage
points between the two periods. The effect of these reforms was that the share of income
tax revenue in GDP increased by only 0.6 percentage points, from 0.5 in 1983 to 1.1 in
1988. Thereafter, the share declined to 0.7% in 1990 before rising to 1.6% in 1993 (Table
8).
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Company income tax
The estimated company income tax buoyancy and elasticity for the 1970–1982 period
were 0.81 and 0.82, respectively. In 1983–1993, the buoyancy and elasticity were
estimated at 1.36 and 1.32, respectively, showing a vast improvement in the productivity
of company income tax revenue in the period. For the buoyancy, the increase was 67.6%
and for the elasticity it was 61.8% in 1983–1993 (Table 6). The recovery in the company
tax revenue in 1983-1993 was reflected in its share in GDP. As a percentage of GDP,
company tax revenue generally declined in the 1970–1982 period. As Table 8 shows, the
share declined slightly from 1.5% of GDP in 1970 to 1.2% in 1972 and thereafter increased
sharply to an average of 1.9% in 1975/76. After this period, the share declined sharply,
reaching 0.4% of GDP in 1983. After 1983, however, the share increased steadily to
2.6% in 1988, dropped to 1.5% in 1991 and picked up again, reaching 2.0% in 1993.
The poor performance of company tax revenue in 1970–1982 reflected the sharp
decline in industrial production, and thus the base of company tax, following the general
decline of the economy over the period. Although Ghana’s industrial capacity is relatively
large, diverse and long-established compared with most other African countries, it has
largely been underutilized.  Excess capacity has therefore been a common feature of the
sector, and the situation was exacerbated by the high investment activity in the 1974-
Figure 2. Effective income tax rates, 1985 and 1993
1976 period. The average rate of capacity utilization during the period 1970–1977 was
in the range of 43%-52%. Capacity utilization worsened in the late 1970s and early
1980s as the country’s ability to import raw materials and spare parts diminished. By
1982, the average capacity utilization had dropped to 21%, with the decline particularly
acute in the textile subsector (World Bank, 1985). Correspondingly, manufacturing output
remained stagnant between 1970 and 1977 after a dip in 1973/74, and then declined
sharply in the 1977–1980 period. The sector’s output is estimated to have declined by
8.3% in 1980/81, followed by a further decline of over 20% in 1981/82 (World Bank,
1985). Thus, far from being a leading sector generating economic growth, the
manufacturing sector became a lagging sector with huge underutilized capacity.
The immediate cause of the precipitous decline in industrial production in the 1970–
1982 period was the acute shortage of imported inputs, arising from the inability of the
economy as a whole to generate sufficient foreign exchange and the high costs of
manufacturing production, which prevented the sector from meeting its own foreign
exchange needs through export earnings. The decline of the export sector during the
period made the tight foreign exchange situation much worse. The difficulties in obtaining
vital imported spare parts and raw materials forced manufacturers to restrict output.
Industries based on domestic resources also found themselves in equally bad shape as a
result of the strong policy bias against agricultural production.
Apart from the acute shortage of essential imported inputs, the price and distribution
controls that characterized the period and tended to favour trade also discouraged industrial
production. The price controls interfered extensively with the ability of producers to
raise ex-factory prices to the level of the domestic market prices. In this way, the policy
reduced the protection and profits of domestic industries to the extent that most reported
manufacturing statistics often showed production costs that exceeded the value of sales.
This development not only prevented manufacturers from sharing in the scarcity value
of the goods they produced, it also adversely affected revenue mobilization from company
tax, excise duty and sales taxes.
The high revenue performance of company tax in 1983–1993 stemmed from the modest
recovery in industrial production, brought about through the availability of foreign
exchange, which allowed an increased inflow of imported raw materials, spare parts and
capital goods needed to maintain and replace the ageing capital stock. As a result, capacity
utilization in large and medium manufacturing enterprises increased from 18% in 1984
to 41% in 1989 while industrial production grew at an annual average rate of 7.7% from
1984 to 1993 (GOG, 1992b). The abolition of price and distribution controls also
contributed to the stimulation of industrial production as it allowed producers to “charge
what the market could bear”, thereby ensuring a balance between sales revenue and
production costs. It also removed delays and uncertainties in industrial activity and
enhanced producers’ ability to assure the banks of adequate cash flows (necessary to
obtain credit).
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Sales tax
Sales tax buoyancy was estimated at 0.69 and elasticity at 0.68 in 1970–1982. Comparing
the corresponding coefficients of 1.71 and 1.59 in 1983–1993 (Table 6), one observes a
tremendous increase in the productivity of sales tax revenue in the latter period. The
estimated coefficients for the 1983–1993 period represent an increase of 148.5% for the
buoyancy and 133.4% for the elasticity, making sales tax revenue the one that experienced
the most improvement in 1983–1993. As a percentage of GDP, sales tax revenue declined
steadily in the 1970–1982 period. Thereafter, the share in GDP increased sharply to
1.1% in 1986 and averaged 2.3% each year in 1987–1993. Indeed, the shares of sales tax
revenue in GDP in each year of 1989–1993 were double the shares in each year in 1970-
1982 (Table 8).
The poor performance of sales tax revenue in 1970–1982 was due in part to the decline
in real private consumption expenditures, the base on which the tax is imposed, but more
to the poor administration of the sales tax itself. Following the general decline of the
economy, per capita real income declined by about 30% between 1970 and 1983 (World
Bank, 1984). Accompanied by worsening income distribution and growing
unemployment, the incidence of absolute poverty increased, which in turn caused a sharp
decline in real private consumption expenditure and thus sales tax revenue. The use of
controlled ex-factory prices as a basis for computing sales tax liability, particularly during
the high inflation period of 1977–1982, also contributed to the erosion of the value of
sales, the base on which the tax was imposed. To this one must also add tax evasion and
laxity in tax collection, the two endemic tax problems that characterized the period.
The recovery in the growth of sales tax revenue in 1983–1993 was attributed to three
main factors. First, there was a significant improvement in the tax collection brought
about by the restructuring of the tax collection machinery and the whole tax administration.
This was supported by the abolition of the price control system, which had created a
wide divergence between the official ex-factory prices (the base at which sales taxes are
assessed) and the market price (the base at which transaction takes place). Second, the
conversion into sales tax of excise duties levied on all locally produced goods, except for
tobacco and beverages, also contributed significantly to the high buoyancy of the sales
tax revenue, particularly in the period after 1987. Third, the recovery of real GDP growth
in 1984–1993 allowed for the first time in many years sustained gains in real private
income per capita of about 2.8% a year. These gains permitted an expansion in real
consumption expenditures, the base of sales tax, of about 2.5% each year during the
period (Kapur et al., 1991).
Excise duty
The estimated buoyancy of 1.05 for excise tax in 1970–1982 was higher than the
corresponding coefficient of 0.92 in 1983–1993. Similarly, the estimated elasticity of
1.16 for 1970–1982 was higher than the 0.99 elasticity estimated for the 1983–1993
period. These figures indicate a decline of 12.6% in the buoyancy and 14.4% percent in
the elasticity in 1983–1993 (Table 6). As a percentage of GDP, revenue from excise tax
was the only one that experienced a decline in 1983–1993. The share of the excise tax
revenue in GDP increased from 1.3% in 1970 to 1.7% in 1982, with a sharp jump in 1980
and 1981. In 1983, the share declined to 0.8% of GDP. Thereafter, excise tax revenue
resumed growth, reaching 2.1% of GDP in 1986. After 1986, however, the share declined
steadily, reaching 1.2% in 1992 (Table 8).
Throughout the 1970–1986 period, excise taxes were imposed on few manufactured
products, thereby making the collection relatively easy and evasion relatively difficult.
In addition, revenue from petroleum tax until 1986 was counted as part of excise tax
revenue, thus causing the productivity of excise tax to increase as prices of petroleum
products rose, especially in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The decline in the buoyancy
and elasticity in the 1983–1993 period was attributed to the abolition of all excise duties
on products other than beverages and tobacco in 1987 and the successive reduction in
the duty rates of the affected goods. The conversion of the excise tax on petroleum to a
de facto petroleum tax was also a factor accounting for the low productivity of excise tax
revenue in the period.
Import tax
The impact of the tax reform measures was also seen in the performance of import tax
revenue. The estimated import tax buoyancy and elasticity in 1970–1982 were both less
than unity, 0.6 and 0.59, respectively. Compared with the corresponding coefficients of
1.32 and 1.21 estimated for the 1983–1993 period (Table 6), the productivity of the
import tax revenue was low in 1970–1982. This poor performance could be attributed to
1) the compression of imports resulting from the acute foreign exchange shortages that
characterized the period, 2) the valuation of imports at the artificially over-valued exchange
rate, 3) the use of specific duty rates rather than ad valorem rates in computing duties
payable, and 4) evasion and laxity in tax collection.
The high productivity of the import tax revenue in 1983–1993 was due to the success
of the measures taken to address the import tax problems in the 1970–1982 period. First,
the substantial inflow of foreign exchange, arising from the expansion in exports, increased
foreign loans and remittances and the abolition of the import licensing system, allowed
a complete recovery of imports. Second, the successive devaluations of the exchange
rate contributed substantially to the restoration of the import tax base. Third, the
replacement of all specific duty rates by the ad valorem duty rates together with the
establishment of the uniform tariff rate for most imports (which greatly simplified the
collection process) allowed more import tax to be collected. The increased tax collection
was also supported by improvement in the tax administration.
Table 9 shows the impact of the changes in the import tax rates, exchange rate
adjustments and changes in imports (valued in US dollars) on the share of import tax
revenue in GDP. The entries in the table show that the major source of growth in the
import tax revenue’s share in GDP in 1970–1982 was imports valued in US dollars. In 11
out of the 13 years, imports contributed positively to the changes in import tax revenue/
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Table 9: Decomposition of sources of change in import tax/GDP ratio (percentages)
YEAR ER/P ETR MGS 1/GDP TOTAL
1970 -32.4 34.2 132.3 -41.0 100.0
1971 -21.2 24.9 122.7 -26.4 100.0
1972 -14.9 20.7 97.5 -3.4 100.0
1973 -288.1 -188.6 657.3 -80.6 100.0
1974 -192.1 -125.7 471.5 -53.7 100.0
1975 114.6 8.9 35.4 -58.9 100.0
1976 -346.0 293.5 102.3 50.3 100.0
1977 -513.0 392.6 243.2 -22.8 100.0
1978 64.6 8.7 -15.5 42.2 100.0
1979 -42.4 154.3 3.2 -15.1 100.0
1980 134.9 34.8 -72.1 2.4 100.0
1981 463.9 -352.4 12.2 -23.6 100.0
1982 64.7 -54.9 108.3 -18.1 100.0
1983 124.5 -140.2 98.6 17.1 100.0
1984 591.8 -60.9 -384.9 -45.9 100.0
1985 54.3 -27.9 85.7 -12.0 100.0
1986 50.0 3.1 64.2 -17.3 100.0
1987 -232.5 371.6 -90.1 51.0 100.0
1988 25.5 -286.0 256.5 104.1 100.0
1989 11.3 97.7 5.2 -14.3 100.0
1990 54.1 101.7 -68.6 12.8 100.0
1991 166.5 -85.5 -127.3 146.3 100.0
1992 253.9 -243.9 146.3 -56.3 100.0
1993 89.7 -18.2 39.9 -11.3 100.0
*  figures may not add up to exactly 100 due to rounding to one decimal point.
Methodology:
Define            MT = ETR . ER .MGS
       MT/(P.GDP) = (ETR. ER . MGS ) / (P.GDP)
= ETR . ER/P .MGS . 1/GDP
∆log (MT/P.GDP) = ∆log ETR + ∆log (ER/P) + ∆log (MGS) + ∆log (1/GDP)
where MT = import tax revenue; ETR = effective tax rate; ER = nominal exchange rate (cedis= US$1);
MGS = imports valued in US dollars; P = GDP deflator; GDP = gross domestic product (nominal).
GDP ratio. The average annual contribution was estimated at 146.5%. The contribution
of the changes in the real  exchange was negative during the period. As the table shows,
the exchange rate over-valuation was the major source of deterioration in the import tax
revenue performance in the period. The exchange rate adjustment, however, was the
dominant factor explaining growth in the import tax revenue in 1983–1993. In 10 of
those 11 years, adjustments in the exchange rate positively affected the import tax revenue,
so that its contribution reached an annual average of 108.1%. The contribution of changes
in the effective tax rates in 1983–1993 was largely negative, caused mainly by the lowering
of the import duty rates on standard and luxury goods and the abolition of some special
duty rates and duties on building materials in 1991. Although the change from specific to
ad valorem duty rates in 1990 contributed to the growth of import tax revenue, its effect
was largely offset by the lowering of the duty rates.
Cocoa export duty
The estimated buoyancy and elasticity of the cocoa export duty in 1970–1982 were all
negative, -0.5 for buoyancy and -0.52 for elasticity. Although the estimated buoyancy
and elasticity in 1983-1993 were positive, they were less than unity, 0.83 for buoyancy
and 0.75 for elasticity (Table 6). The poor performance of the cocoa export duty in 1970–
1982 could be explained in part by the decline in domestic production and exports and
partly by the fall in world market prices. Cocoa production fell gradually from 409,000
metric tonnes in 1970 to 329,000 metric tonnes in 1977, then dropped sharply to a mere
179,000 metric tonnes in 1983. At the same time, the spot price of Ghana’s cocoa in
London markets increased from £381 in 1970 to £2,935 in 1977 and then dropped sharply,
reaching £1,033 in 1982. As a result of both the decline in export volume and export
prices, the share of cocoa export duty in GDP declined sharply, from 7% in 1970 to 0.9%
in 1980, with some jump between 1976 and 1978. Since 1983, the cocoa export duty’s
share in GDP has gradually increased, reaching 3.6% in 1987 and averaging 1.6% in
1988-1993 (Table 8).
The decline in cocoa production and export in 1970–1982 was due in part to the
ageing stock of cocoa trees, widespread diseases, bad weather and the shortage of farm
labour and inputs, but mainly to the extremely low producer prices paid to farmers.
Cocoa farmers received 37% of cocoa export receipts in 1970. The farmers’ share
subsequently increased to 44% in 1972/73, but dropped to 29% in 1974/75. Thereafter,
the farmers’ share ranged from 26% to 47%, except for 1981 and 1982 when world price
declined and the cocoa export duty was abolished (Stryker, 1990). The low prices paid to
cocoa farmers was due to three main factors. First, the over-valuation of the exchange
rate throughout the 1970-1982 period made it difficult for the Ghana Cocoa Marketing
Board (GCMB), which receives its revenues in foreign exchange from cocoa exports, to
pay a high cedi price to the farmers. Second, the GCMB itself became inefficient, leading
to increased “marketing costs” (payments to GCMB). Finally, the government steadily
increased the (implicit) tax on cocoa exports by holding producer prices down (Younger,
1989).
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The improvement in the cocoa export duty in 1983–1993 was the result of theand
rehabilitation and restructuring of the cocoa sector (with foreign aid) that commenced in
1983 and exchange rate reforms that allowed significant increases in producer prices.
The improved price incentives and rehabilitation of cocoa farms led to the recovery in
cocoa output and export, which reached 305,000 metric tonnes in 1993 (Economist
Intelligence Unit, 1994), and to a gradual decline in exports to neighbouring countries
through illegal channels.
VII.  Mobilization of additional revenue
The tax reform measures introduced in the 1983–1993 period succeeded in improving
revenue generation and enhancing efficiency of tax administration and the equity of the
tax system. The tax administration has been greatly improved, the tax base broadened
and the whole structure of taxation rationalized. The reforms also made the tax regime
less distortionary and strengthened economic incentives, especially incentives to promote
savings and investment. Despite these significant gains, government revenue as a
proportion of GDP is still too low compared with the average obtained in the developing
world, and even with the average for Africa. As the entries in Table 10 show, total
government revenue (including grants) averaged 14.6% of GDP in 1986–1991, compared
with the average of 24.4% for Africa and over 25% for developing countries. The
comparative shares of tax revenue shown in the table imply that it is possible for a
developing country to raise its tax revenue into the range of 11% to 25% of GDP, but that
it is only the industrial countries that will be able to sustain tax revenue shares in excess
of 30% of GDP. The 11.9% tax revenue’s share in GDP for Ghana is at the lower level of
the developing countries threshold, indicating that from a macroeconomic standpoint
there is ample scope for further increases in tax revenue. The problem with Ghana’s
resource mobilization is that revenue as a percentage of GDP has fallen short of budgeted
levels in each year since 1986. While revenue targets have been met in absolute terms,
higher than expected inflation has led to higher nominal GDP and thus lower revenue-
GDP ratios, suggesting the existence of room for further revenue expansion.
But what are the revenue enhancement options available to the country?
Value-added tax (VAT)
The major option available for raising additional revenue is the introduction of VAT to
replace the existing sales tax. VAT is an attractive tax because it is a powerful source of
revenue that does not significantly distort businesses’ and consumers’ decisions. The
record of VAT in generating large amounts of revenue quickly and in comparatively
painless fashion has earned it the reputation as a “money machine” (Gillis, 1990). By
design, VAT improves compliance as the collection of the tax revenue through a paper
trail (invoices) helps auditors to detect evasion. The non-distortionary (neutrality)
properties of VAT are attributable to the provisions that effectively free investment goods
Some forms of intersectoral disparities are unavoidable, but they can be minimized through
appropriate choice of exemptions and rate structure.
48 RESEARCH PAPER 74
Table 10: International comparison of revenue profile, 1986-1991
(period average as percentage of GDP)
Region/country Total revenue Tax revenue Non-tax revenue Grants
Industrial countries 34.9 31.2 3.1 0.6
Developing countries 25.4 17.1 6.4 1.9
Africa 24.4 18.1 3.9 2.4
Asia 20.4 14.2 4.3 1.9b
Europea 34.6 24.8 9.1 0.7
Middle East 27.3 10.7 13.1 3.5
Western Hemisphere 20.4 16.4 3.0 1.0
Ghana 14.6 11.9 1.8 0.9
Source: Computed from IMF (1993).
a excluding industrial countries.
b excluding the Pacific Islands of Tonga, Vanuatu, Solomon Island and Papua New Guinea.
In the 1960s, only 9 countries in the world levied VAT; now more than 90 countries
do so. Of the OECD countries, only USA and Australia do not use VAT. All the Latin
American countries now have VAT, as do the ex-communist economies of Eastern Europe.
In the developing world, VAT has become the consumption tax choice. For the majority
of the countries for which data are available, revenue from VAT constitute some 20% of
total revenue, while the share of VAT in GDP is higher than 3% (Tait, 1991; Gillis,
1990).
The Government of Ghana recognized the need for VAT in its 1993 budget and began
preparations for its introduction. A bill introducing VAT was discussed and approved in
Parliament in October 1994, but its implementation was deferred until March 1995.
Initially fixed at 17.5%, the VAT was expected to double the 1994 sales tax revenue.
Although sales tax showed the highest tax buoyancy in the 1983–1993 period, its structure
poses serious problems for further reductions in tax rates and revenue expansion, stemming
principally from the narrow base of the tax, as it is applied only to imports and locally
manufactured goods. The exclusion of the distribution and services sectors does not
make the tax comply fully with its description as a tax on all consumption expenditures.
It also compromises its fairness to all income-earners. In addition, the sales tax’s multiple
rates compound the existing problem of compliance. Further, the sales tax regime makes
the country’s exports non-competitive since it does not permit recovery of indirect taxes
paid by most exporters on their inputs. It is the need to remove these deficiencies
(distortions) and to improve the indirect tax revenue and its administration that made the
introduction of the VAT the critical option.
Another important reason for adopting VAT in Ghana is related to the country’s desire
for accelerated economic growth. The VAT will allow the country to rely less on income-
based taxation, which tends to discriminate against saving and investment, in favour of
current consumption. Furthermore, the export-development strategy would be facilitated
by the VAT, which does not tax exports and provides tax refunds for the inputs embodied
in export production. Moreover, the broadly based VAT would enhance the stability of
revenue and reduce the volatility associated with some of the commodity-based revenue
such as cocoa and petroleum taxes.
A major problem that is likely to confront the administration and implementation of
the VAT system in the country is the poor culture of record keeping. The concept of VAT
calculation involves the keeping of records of so many factors that help in determining
the charge to tax, qualification for exemptions, zero rating refunds, etc. Most commercial
business houses are owned by illiterates who hardly keep proper records of their business
transactions. There are also many dishonest business people who would want to falsify
their records to beat the tax administrators for personal aggrandizement (Kassim, 1994).
The artificial price increases that may occur as a result of the acts of some greedy business
people is also an issue to confront under a VAT system in Ghana. Besides, the public,
especially the business sector, will need to be well informed and properly educated on
the need for VAT, pros and cons, the items for exemption, and all that VAT is about,
through seminars, workshops, and television and radio communications.
The government recognized some of the potential problems that VAT introduction
will bring but did nothing about it. What the government did was to entrench in the VAT
Act severe penalties for false declarations, falsifications, illegal alteration of VAT invoices
and evasion. For example, the Commissioner for VAT was granted the authority under
part IV of the Act to impose penalties not exceeding three times the amount of VAT not
paid or falsified in addition to a forfeiture of any goods involved or to seek through the
courts an imprisonment term of not exceeding two years, or both, for offenders. On the
question of public debate, consultation and education on VAT, nothing was done in the
country. The discussions on VAT were limited to members of the Parliament. It was
therefore not surprising that the VAT introduction created uncertainties and suspicion in
the minds of the general public, leading to violent public protest and eventual withdrawal
of the tax for reconsideration. The public concern was not so much about the introduction
of VAT as a new tax system, but more with the lack of public consultation and discussion,
the timing of its introduction, and the initial high rate of 17.5% All these point to the fact
that tax policy and tax laws must conform to the society’s commitment to the rule of law.
This means not only that the system should be effective in the enforcement of tax laws,
but also the citizens’ right to be taxed should be protected. In other words, taxation must
be founded on a moral consensus around the need to nurture the tax system as a vital
component of national existence and in the valued ownership of all people in the country.
Property tax
Local governments in Ghana have traditionally depended on central government grants
to cover most of their expenditures, which have constrained their ability to provide and
maintain local infrastructures. As part of the central government’s fiscal adjustment,
many local government grants have been reduced, and the local governments are becoming
increasingly dependent on locally generated revenue sources. Of the many locally raised
revenue sources, property tax is the most important and effective. Unfortunately, this is
one area that the tax reform process never touched. In fact, there had been no general
revaluations between 1960 and the late 1980s, when the property tax was based on
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construction costs and its administration taken over by the central government. Although
a well established rating system had operated in the main urban centres of the country
for some time, by the mid 1980s the tax base in Accra, for example, was well out of date.
The last revaluation was done in 1960. Inflation since then had been high and almost half
of the properties were missing from the valuation roll (Keith, 1993). As a result,
supplementary valuations of new properties have failed to keep pace with growth, causing
the share of property tax revenue in total revenue to become increasingly  insignificant.
The reason for the neglect of property tax in Ghana, and indeed throughout the world,
is that it is a politically sensitive issue. The sensitivity stems from the fact that the tax is
very visible, effective and difficult to avoid. Besides, annual action is required to keep
the tax buoyant. The visibility of the tax and the effect of gearing, i.e., that a small
increase in a local government budget can trigger a big increase in the property tax rate,
magnify the political difficulties.
Since property tax will for some time remain an important source of local government
revenue, action is needed in this area. More recently, a twinning arrangement between
the Ghana Valuation Division and the UK Valuation Office has enabled a full revaluation
of all properties in Accra to be accomplished. The exercise led to an increase in the
number of properties under valuation from 46,000 to 250,000, thereby increasing the tax
base 800-fold (Keith, 1993). Similar efforts are being undertaken in four other cities.
This exercise needs to be extended to all the urban areas to ensure a full exploitation of
this potential local government revenue source.
Income tax
With respect to personal income tax, the satisfaction or compliance with the equity
principle implies that the tax base should necessarily and sufficiently include all sources
of income. Moreover, the rate of taxation should change according to different levels of
income rather than income sources. While tremendous successes have been achieved in
adjustments in the effective income tax rates (effective tax rates have declined for all
income groups), the equity principle appears to have faltered. The income concept
primarily adopted in the country is monetary income. Thus conceptually and operationally,
non-monetized incomes are not reckoned as taxable incomes and are therefore not brought
under the tax net. Personal income taxes are levied on only earned incomes, while a
greater percentage of people in the subsistence and informal sectors who do not monetize
their incomes are not covered. Similarly, most of the people whose incomes are monetized
have other incomes in kind – petrol coupons, free accommodation, free medical care,
etc. Investigations revealed that private medical practitioners and lawyers whose incomes
are for all practical purposes higher than most employees in the formal establishments
pay lower taxes. A comparison of their life styles with the taxes they pay shows that
these groups under-declare their incomes either by deliberately doing so or because the
incomes are not monetized.
The present conceptualization of income in the country coupled with the poor
accounting records in the formal sector suggest that if nothing is done the fiscal authorities
are for a long time going to negate other facets of taxation and concentrate on revenue
generation through indirect taxation. Clearly, this would not permit a maximum
mobilization of revenue from the existing tax handles. The solution is for the definition
of income for the purposes of income tax policy to be reviewed. This exercise would
enable the tax authorities to extend the tax net to cover incomes earned in the private
sector and other informal activities besides the incomes generated in the formal
government sector. In the meantime, the standard assessment tax systems as applied to
artisans and the Ghana Road Transport Union are policy steps in the right direction. To
make it more efficient and equitable the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
must consider undertaking a further study of the incomes of these and other groups so as
to be able to develop commensurate tax schedules that would not defeat equity and
incentive principles. The need to extend this tax system to encompass the millions of
individuals, particularly those in the trading business, and smaller enterprises whose
engagement in the formal sector is vital for revenue growth should also be considered.
This could be facilitated by simple rules and procedures, and a minimum of fiscal
complexity.
With respect to company tax, the ability to generate maximum revenue from this
source depends on the complete recovery of the industrial sector, which in itself depends
on the speed and strength of the private sector’s response to the macroeconomic reforms.
To date, the private sector’s response appears to be not fully satisfactory, reflecting the
initial poor state of the economy and the time needed to rebuild confidence in the
sustainability of the new policy measures and in the outlook of the economy as a whole.
The protracted economic decline from 1970 to 1982 left the private sector in a state of
virtual devastation, from which it will require a length of time to recover. In particular,
the dearth of medium-term financing, the rudimentary state of the capital market and the
general weaknesses in financial intermediation make it difficult for companies to find
means of financing other than short-term bank credit. The generally low profitability of
many private firms and the low overall domestic savings also limit the prospects for self-
financing (Kapur et al., 1991). The policy measures introduced, especially after 1990,
should contribute to the alleviation of many of the problems facing the private sector,
and thus attract more private investment. In particular, these include the reduction in the
tax on capital and investment income, including lowering the company tax rate from
45% to 35% in 1993, and reforms in the capital gains tax. Together with the extension of
the capital allowances provided under the investment code to all manufacturing enterprises
and the establishment of the stock exchange and divestiture of state enterprises, these
constitute a major reform that should attract positive investment response.
Tax administration
Despite the many changes that the tax reforms have brought about, some problems of
institutional infrastructure of tax administration still exist. First, the audit capacity of the
tax authorities calls for serious improvement. An extensive audit of enterprises in both
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the formal and informal sectors of the economy to provide comprehensive information
relating to potential taxpayers and their sources and levels of income has never been
done. Clearly, this has serious implications for tax revenue mobilization, as the
administration is unable to provide indicators of critical inputs to estimate taxable bases.
For example, in 1987–1989, tax revenue out-turns consistently exceeded the original
estimates. The experience of 1986 also stands out vividly in terms of both revenue and
expenditure estimates. The ex ante revenue estimate amounted to 85 billion cedis against
an estimated expenditure of 90 billion cedis, producing a deficit of 5 billion cedis. And
yet the budgetary out-turns produced a surplus. To increase the capacity of the tax
administration and enhance human resources development, the current initiative to
introduce  computerization is an exercise in the right direction. The examination of
taxpayer records needs to be stepped up with a view to establishing accurate tax liability.
The Internal Revenue Service would have to take concrete steps towards reviewing the
operations of identifiable bodies, who in the past have considered the periodic tax
payments based on standard assessment as final tax.
With the present inflationary pressures, tax deferment and/or evasion must be checked.
These practices benefit the violator or tax dodger. In the case of outright evasion, the
budgetary authorities lose massively, whereas in the case of deferment, the taxpayer
enjoys benefits equivalent to the prevailing nominal rate of interest on personal loans.
Thus the gains from tax deferment become costs to the government budget. They also
breed inequality among taxpayers with different possibilities of deferment. To prevent
these tax malpractices, the tax authorities would need to fight with an efficient and honest
tax administrative capacity as well as strong sanctions to deal with tax defaults, deferment
and evasion. Tax penalties would have to be high enough to cover costs and ensure
equity. At the same time the legal capacities to enforce compliance would need to be
expanded and strengthened. A new penal law designed to reduce the burden of evidence
required before the tax authorities can proceed with penalties needs to be introduced to
strengthen the hand of the authorities in prosecuting tax evasion and tax fraud. This legal
modification must allow for more flexibility in the application of fiscal secrecy, however,
while permitting the tax authorities to publish (if need be) the list of defaulting taxpayers.
Generally, the tax administrators need to improve their own managerial capacities through
actions in the areas of collection management, audits and internal control, and personnel
policy.
Tax policy
A major issue of concern with the taxation system in Ghana is that the specific objectives
of tax policy are not always clear. It is usually difficult to make out whether the tax
policies are designed to mobilize additional revenue or to afford the fiscal authorities the
opportunity to realize a broader set of socio economic objectives, e.g., income
redistribution, incentive to industrial development, stabilization of prices, redressing of
external disequilibrium, and prohibition of the consumption of certain goods and services.
Indirect taxes, for example, have been the major source of revenue and to compensate
for the revenue loss from income and property taxes, they have used extensively. But a
tax policy that aims at mobilizing revenue from indirect sources should recognize the
elasticities involved. A tax policy that aims at eschewing imports must realize that it
cannot generate revenue at the same time. In fact, the introduction of the “super sales
tax” on selected imports in the 1990 budget and many of the tax incentives granted under
the 1985 Investment Code smack of this inconsistency. The point is that tax policy is
multifaceted and the various facets may not be compatible in orientation. It is therefore
very important for the tax authorities to make clear the objectives of their tax policies so
as to be able to introduce fiscal instruments that are consistent with the objectives.
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VIII. Conclusion
The rapid expansion of government expenditures amid low revenue growth in the period
leading to 1983 led to serious fiscal imbalances in the Ghanaian economy. This
development created the need for a larger share of the private sector’s resources to be
ceded to the government as taxes to finance the increased expenditures. Since 1983,
therefore, the tax system of Ghana has undergone a fundamental reform, aimed at
improving revenue generation and maximizing the efficiency of collection. Tax reform
has thus been used as an instrument for raising the revenue productivity of the tax system.
Estimates of buoyancies and income elasticities of individual taxes and the overall
tax system, based on empirical evidence, show that the tax reform process contributed
greatly to the growth of revenue productivity from 1983 to 1993. This is evident in the
elasticities of more than unity for the major taxes and of the total tax system. In addition,
the overall tax system and all the major taxes, except excise tax and cocoa export duty,
showed buoyancies of more than unity. The estimated buoyancies of the overall tax
system, income tax, sales tax and import tax were all greater than their respective
elasticities, showing the positive role that the reform has played in the revenue productivity
growth. In particular, the successive devaluations supported by the abolition of price
control and import licensing systems permitted a recovery in international trade and thus
the bases of import tax and export duties. The measures also allowed an increased inflow
of much needed imported inputs to rehabilitate the devastated industrial sector and improve
capacity utilization. The resultant increases in industrial production led to increases in
industrial income and thus company and sales tax revenues. Finally, the simplification of
the import tariff rates and the complete overhaul of the whole tax administration also
allowed more taxes to be collected, thereby contributing to the productivity of the tax
system.
The empirical results have important implications for the Ghanaian fiscal system.
They show that a tax system that is responsive to economic growth is desirable since it
enables tax revenue to grow automatically without resorting to the politically difficult
task of raising tax rates. In this regard, emphasis must be placed on those taxes that have
high revenue elasticities. In the Ghanaian case, all the individual taxes investigated for
the 1983–1993 period had relatively high elasticities, except for personal income tax
which had elasticity of just above unity. The policy implication here is that the authorities
must gradually move away from income-based taxation, which discriminates against
saving and investment, in favour of the consumption-based taxes. Already the country is
well underway toward liberalizing and reducing the tax burden on income. This policy
must be pursued relentlessly.
Comparing the revenue performance over the review period with that of other countries
in Africa and elsewhere, however, the study found that Ghana lies at the bottom threshold
of the performance range for the developing countries, suggesting the existence of room
for further revenue expansion. Various revenue enhancement options, including
introducing VAT to replace the existing sales tax, revaluing properties to broaden the
base of property tax,  reviewing the definition of income for the purposes of income tax,
and further improving the tax administration to improve tax collections and combat evasion
and fraud, were found to be available for use by the tax authorities. Above all, the
authorities must recognize that tax policy and tax laws must conform to the society’s
commitment to the rule of law. That is, the system must not only ensure an effective and
equitable enforcement of tax laws but also that the citizens’ right to be taxed should be
protected both in the design of the tax policy and tax laws and in their implementation.
In other words, taxation must be founded on a wide and transparent consultation. It must
be built on a moral consensus around the need to nurture the tax system as a vital
component of the national existence as well as the valued ownership of all citizens of the
country. There must be room in a democratic society for a healthy debate on tax measures,
although the tax system cannot be seen as a forum for protest against other perceived
wrongs.
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